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Populist antitrust notions suddenly are fashionable again.  At 
their core is the view that antitrust law is responsible for a myriad 
of purported socio-political problems plaguing society today, in-
cluding but not limited to rising income inequality, declining wages, 
and increasing economic and political concentration.  Seizing on 
Americans’ fears about changes to the modern US economy, propo-
nents of populist antitrust policies assert the need to fundamentally 
reshape how we apply our nation’s competition laws in order to im-
plement a variety of prescriptions necessary to remedy these per-
ceived social ills.  The proposals are varied and expansive but have 
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the unifying theme of returning antitrust to the “big-is-bad” en-
forcement era prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century. 
But the criticisms populist antitrust proponents raise are gener-
ally unsupported and often dramatized, and the resulting policy pro-
posals are, accordingly, fatally flawed.  There is sparse evidence 
today suggesting that the underlying trends these critics purportedly 
identify are real or in any way linked to lax antitrust enforcement.  
Ironically, populist antitrust proponents ignore that antitrust law 
debated over 50 years ago the same proposals that they are raising 
anew today.  At that time, leading jurists, economists, enforcers, and 
practitioners from across the political spectrum rejected the use of 
liability standards that seek to evaluate a variety of vague and often 
contradictory socio-political goals or that condemn conduct based 
simply on the size of a company.  They recognized that these tests 
led to incoherent and paradoxical results that often did more to hin-
der than to promote competition by undermining the rule of law and 
fostering corporate welfare.  Instead, antitrust evolved the elegant 
“consumer welfare standard” that simplified the core issue of what 
constitutes harm to competition into a straightforward question: 
does the conduct at issue harm consumers? 
Today, the consumer welfare standard offers a rigorous, objec-
tive, and evidence-based framework for antitrust analysis.  It lever-
ages developments in modern economics more reliably to predict 
when conduct is likely to harm consumers as a result of harm to 
competition.  It offers a tractable test that is broad enough to con-
template a variety of evidence related to consumer welfare but also 
sufficiently objective and clear to cabin discretion and honor the 
principle of the rule of law.  Perhaps most significantly, it is inher-
ently an economic approach to antitrust that benefits from new eco-
nomic learning and is capable of evaluating an evolving set of com-
mercial practices and business models.  These virtues are precisely 
the target of the new populist antitrust movement, which seeks to 
reject economics in favor of mere supposition. 
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This Article makes the case in support of the current consumer 
welfare standard and against a sweeping set of unsupported popu-
list antitrust reforms.  There is significant room for debate within 
the consumer welfare model for what types of conduct should face 
antitrust scrutiny, what evidence is relevant, and where liability 
standards should be drawn.  Such debate is healthy and to the ben-
efit of antitrust enforcement.  But it does not require abandoning 
decades of experience and economic learning that would turn back 
the hands of time and return us to an era where antitrust enforce-
ment was incoherent and deleterious. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Populist antitrust notions are suddenly fashionable again.  At their core is 
the view that antitrust law is responsible for a myriad of purported socio-po-
litical problems plaguing society today, including but not limited to rising in-
come inequality, declining wages, and increasing economic and political con-
centration.1  Seizing on Americans’ fears about changes to the modern U.S. 
economy, proponents of populist antitrust policies assert the need to funda-
mentally reshape how we apply our nation’s competition laws in order to im-
plement a variety of prescriptions necessary to remedy these perceived social 
ills.2  The proposals are varied and expansive, but have the unifying theme of 
returning antitrust to the “big is bad” enforcement era prevalent in the first 
half of the twentieth century.3  Among other things, they would ban broad 
categories of procompetitive mergers, forbid businesses from pursuing com-
mercial arrangements that benefit consumers, and protect inefficient high-cost 
producers from precisely the type of competition the antitrust laws are in-
tended to foster.4  In doing so, the populist antitrust proposals reject funda-
mental lessons gleaned from developments in modern economics and would 
send antitrust careening back to the equivalent of its Stone Age.5 
The criticisms that populist antitrust proponents raise are generally un-
supported and often dramatized, and the resulting policy proposals are, ac-
cordingly, fatally flawed.6  There is sparse evidence today suggesting that the 
underlying trends these critics purportedly identify are real or in any way 
linked to lax antitrust enforcement.7  For instance, critics frequently cite data 
 
 1. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 715–17, 746 
(2018). 
 2. Id. at 717–21. 
 3. Id. at 745. 
 4. See Matt Stoller, How Antitrust Became Mainstream Part 3: The Antimonopoly Political Rev-
olution, PRO-MARKET (July 23, 2019), https://promarket.org/how-antitrust-became-mainstream-part-
3-the-antimonopoly-political-revolution/; see also Client Memorandum from Davis Polk & Wardwell 
LLP, The New Populist Movement in Antitrust: Could It Change the Status Quo and Does It Threaten 
American Businesses? 1, 2, 4 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-10-26_the_new 
_populist_movement_in_antitrust_could_it_change_the_status_quo_and_does_it_threaten_ameri-
can_businesses.pdf [hereinafter Client Memo] (analyzing the ramifications of the populist movement 
on anti-trust law and policy, and specifically how it could impact American businesses); Geoffrey A. 
Manne & Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Big Tech’s Big-Time, Big-Scale Problem, CATO POL’Y REP., 
May/June 2018, at 1, 6. 
 5. See Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6; Stoller, supra note 4. 
 6. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 7. See discussion infra Sections IV.B–C. 
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indicating significant increases to concentration across a wide range of United 
States industries as evidence of failed antitrust policy.8  But these statistics 
typically lump products together, such as fishing reels and pick-up trucks, that 
cannot seriously be considered competitive alternatives and which, moreover, 
suggest several dozen (or more) competitors exist within each of these broad 
industries.9  Nevertheless, in response to these sensationalized concerns, pop-
ulist antitrust proponents seek to abandon the current and well-developed le-
gal framework, which makes consumer welfare the lodestar of the antitrust 
laws, in favor of vague multi-factor tests or a general hostility to large firms.10 
Ironically, populist antitrust proponents ignore that over fifty years ago 
antitrust law debated the same proposals that they are raising anew today.11  
At that time, leading jurists, economists, enforcers, and practitioners from 
across the political spectrum rejected the use of liability standards that seek to 
evaluate a variety of vague and often contradictory socio-political goals or 
that condemn conduct based simply on the size of a company.12  They recog-
nized that these tests led to incoherent and paradoxical results that often did 
more to hinder than to promote competition by undermining the rule of law 
and fostering corporate welfare.13  These regimes were roundly—and 
rightly—condemned.14  In their place, antitrust evolved an elegant framework 
that simplified the core conception of what constitutes harm to competition 
into a straightforward question: does the conduct at issue harm consumers?15 
Today, the consumer welfare standard supports a rigorous, objective, and 
 
 8. See, e.g., William A. Galston & Clara Hendrickson, A Policy at Peace with Itself: Antitrust 
Remedies for Our Concentrated, Uncompetitive Economy, BROOKINGS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www. 
brookings.edu/research/a-policy-at-peace-with-itself-antitrust-remedies-for-our-concentrated-un-
competitive-economy/ (discussing the increase in concentration of the “retail trade” industry); Donald 
F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
797, 807–08 (1987). 
 9. Galston & Hendrickson, supra note 8; infra Section IV.A (arguing that “retail trade” covers a 
broad range of businesses that cannot compete against one another). 
 10. See Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, supra note 4, at 1–2; Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6.  
 11. See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. 
U. L. REV. 281, 282–83 (1956); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 722; Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 7–
8. 
 12. See Turner, supra note 8, at 812–13. 
 13. See id. at 807–08; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 716–17; Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
 14. Client Memo, supra note 4, at 2; Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 8. 
 15. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 742–43. 
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evidence-based framework for antitrust analysis.16  It leverages developments 
in modern economics more reliably to predict when conduct is likely to harm 
consumers as a result of harm to competition.17  It offers a tractable test that 
is broad enough to contemplate a variety of evidence related to consumer wel-
fare but also sufficiently objective and clear to cabin discretion and honor the 
principle of the rule of law.18  Perhaps most significantly, it is inherently an 
economic approach to antitrust that benefits from new economic learning and 
is capable of evaluating an evolving set of commercial practices and business 
models.19  These virtues are precisely the target of the new populist antitrust 
movement, which seeks to reject economics in favor of mere supposition in 
order to achieve decidedly political, not economic, ends.20 
Antitrust is an attractive regulatory tool.21  The vague, terse language of 
the Sherman Act readily lends itself to interpretation with virtually limitless 
scope.22  Indeed, “the urge to treat antitrust as a legal Swiss Army knife capa-
ble of [rectifying] all manner of [perceived] social and economic ills is appar-
ently [quite] difficult to resist,”23 as calls to do so resurface every few decades.  
“Conflating size with market power, and market power with political power, 
many recent calls for regulation of the tech industry are framed in antitrust 
terms.”24 
But that attraction is precisely why we should care about the scope, pro-
cess, and economics of antitrust and the extent of its politicization.25  Antitrust 
in the U.S. has largely resisted the relentless effort toward politicization.26  
Endorsing the populist antitrust approach would prioritize political expedi-
ency over the rule of law.27  It would open the floodgates of antitrust litigation 
 
 16. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 8, 12; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 742; Competition and 
Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Hearing Before Fed. Trade Comm’n, 115 Cong. 61–63 
(2018) [hereinafter FTC Hearing #1] (statement of Janet McDavid, Senior Counsel, Hogan Lovells 
LPP, past Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section). 
 17. Director & Levi, supra note 11, at 287; Turner, supra note 8, at 798–99. 
 18. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 8, 12; Client Memo, supra note 4, at 2.  
 19. Shapiro, supra note 1, at 745. 
 20. Id. at 716, 745; see Stoller, supra note 4; see also Client Memo, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 21. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 6, 12; Galston & Hendrickson, supra note 8. 
 26. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6. 
 27. See infra Section V.B (explaining the many pitfalls of the populist antitrust approach in greater 
detail). 
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and facilitate harmful tendencies, such as rent-seeking, regulatory capture, 
and politically motivated enforcement.28  It would thus unlock a veritable Pan-
dora’s box of concerns that are currently kept in check.29  Chief among them 
is the use of antitrust laws to evade democratically and judicially established 
rules and legal precedent.30 
This Article makes a case in support of the current consumer welfare 
standard and against a sweeping set of unsupported populist antitrust re-
forms.31  There is significant room for debate within the consumer welfare 
model for what types of conduct should face antitrust scrutiny, what evidence 
is relevant, and where liability standards should be drawn.32  Such debate is 
healthy and to the benefit of antitrust enforcement.33  But it does not require 
abandoning decades of experience and economic learning that would turn 
back the hands of time and return us to an era where antitrust enforcement was 
incoherent and deleterious.34 
Part II traces the history of antitrust enforcement, examining the conflict-
ing and contradictory results of the “big is bad” approach to antitrust and ex-
plaining the serious debate that led to the adoption of the consumer welfare 
standard.35  Part III explains the benefits of the consumer welfare approach: 
namely, offering consistency and coherency to a previously wayward area of 
 
 28. See Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, 
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 206 (1991) (“[A] populist antitrust regime would induce increases 
in rent-seeking behavior, including increases in antitrust litigation.”). 
 29. See infra Section V.B (comparing the current antitrust enforcement policies with predicted 
consequences of the populist approach).  
 30. See Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 TUL. 
L. REV. 1163, 1172–74 (1988) (discussing the “basic policy choices of the 1890 Congress” that en-
acted the Sherman Act, and concluding that the widening scope of economic regulations is not sup-
ported by legislative history). 
 31. See infra Parts III–V. 
 32. Compare Arthur, supra note 30, at 1205 (describing a “hands off” approach to antitrust policy 
that requires a high standard of evidence for antitrust plaintiffs to meet their burden of proving injury), 
with Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369 
(1965) (suggesting that any evidence that a competitor has been injured may be used to show a less-
ening of competition). 
 33. See Arthur, supra note 30, at 1169 (encouraging debate about antitrust policy because a “re-
laxed attitude toward wholesale judicial policymaking fails to recognize either the questionable legit-
imacy of unelected judges making society’s basic policy choices or the reality that standardless, polit-
ical decisionmaking undermines a coherent and stable rule of law”). 
 34. See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 44–46 (2000) (illustrating the clarification and development of the 
Sherman Act’s meaning through case law form 1890–1914). 
 35. See infra Part II. 
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law; tethering antitrust analysis and outcomes to economics, empirics, and 
evidence; fostering the rule of law domestically and abroad; and providing a 
standard that evolves alongside economic developments.36  Part IV articulates 
the shortcomings of the populist antitrust approach, which has little to no em-
pirical support for its contentions or proffered solutions.37  Part V discusses 
the serious dangers of adopting the populist antitrust approach, including re-
ducing consumer welfare and fostering corporate welfare and rent-seeking.38 
II. THE RISE OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD IN ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 
The broad strokes of United States antitrust law are articulated in the con-
cise language of the governing federal statutes, the first of which was passed 
in 1890.39  As a result of the exceptionally brief nature of these statutes, anti-
trust law has developed primarily through common law judicial interpreta-
tions.40  The contours of the antitrust laws therefore have been primarily 
driven by the case selection of United States enforcers and private plaintiffs, 
and ultimately articulated in the decisions issued by the federal courts.41  In 
true common law fashion, antitrust law has evolved considerably over time.42  
To understand how antitrust law is applied today and why, it is important to 
examine where antitrust law came from and how it has developed over the 
course of more than 125 years.43 
 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
 38. See infra Part V. 
 39. The principal federal antitrust laws are the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2012); the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); and the Federal Trade Commission Act  
of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 40. See, e.g., Director & Levi, supra note 11, at 281 (“The durability of the antitrust laws is perhaps 
their main characteristic.  In large measure, this is a common law durability, built on a case by case 
development, and exhibiting that flexibility which is the strength of the common law.”). 
 41. See Arthur, supra note 30, at 1190 (“Even more than in other areas, the Supreme Court in 
antitrust law has mixed its jurisprudential styles, alternating among three distinct modes of antitrust 
decisionmaking.”); Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 43–46 (defining current antitrust policy). 
 42. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 58 (“The consciously evolutionary quality of the 
U.S. antitrust statutes, with their implicit recognition of the need to adjust doctrine over time in light 
of experience and new learning, gives economists considerable power to influence competition law 
and policy.”). 
 43. See generally Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34 (explaining the entire 125-year judicial history 
of antitrust law). 
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A. The Early Years: From Nebulous Standards to “Big is Bad” 
Starting in 1890 with the passage of the Sherman Act, courts began to 
give shape to the inchoate text of the antitrust laws.44  The period from 1890 
to 1914 was marked by courts struggling to operationalize a law that “directly 
implicated economic concepts” and yet was so brief and unspecific that it was 
difficult to discern how these economic concepts should be applied.45  As a 
result, the courts faced a monumental task in attempting to develop a coherent 
set of antitrust law principles.46  The difficulties faced by these early courts 
are easy to understand.47  For instance, the Sherman Act nominally forbids 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade”48—a command that courts eventually realized was im-
possible to enforce literally, as every contract imposes some degree of a re-
straint on trade.49  Nevertheless, in the early case law, the Supreme Court was 
willing to take the Sherman Act’s prohibition literally.50  This proved to be an 
unworkable approach, however, and soon thereafter courts began to distin-
guish between unlawful “naked” restraints that clearly harmed competition 
and “ancillary” restraints necessary to effectuate an otherwise lawful commer-
cial contract.51  Antitrust thus began to develop a functional jurisprudence that 
recognized that not every restraint violated the Sherman Act.52 
 
 44. See id. at 44 (“Although the Sherman Act’s first two decades featured no whirlwind of antitrust 
enforcement, the courts began shaping the law’s vague terms.”). 
 45. See id. at 43 (noting the shifting “contours of antitrust doctrine” that resulted from the court’s 
duty to “elaborate the Sherman Act’s broad commands”). 
 46. See id. at 43–44 (explaining the ambiguity of the Sherman Act); Arthur, supra note 30, at 
1172–73 (“After four decades of judicial construction, the Act had a settled meaning that was con-
sistent with the basic policy choices of the 1890 Congress.”). 
 47. See Comment, Labor and the Sherman Act, 49 YALE L.J. 518, 523 (1940) (“Within the broad 
scope of interpretation offered by the general words of the Statute, the Supreme Court could have 
chosen almost any path.”). 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 49. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 44 (“Some early cases . . . applied [the Sherman 
Act’s] language literally, yet even these decisions recognized that prohibiting all agreements which 
curbed commercial freedom could imperil beneficial forms of cooperation, such as partnerships.”). 
 50. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897). 
 51. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d sub nom. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
 52. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 44–45 (exposing the issues with interpreting the statute 
literally); see, e.g., Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400, 409 (1911) 
(recognizing that the defendant’s agreements placed a restraint on trade, but nevertheless upholding 
the agreements). 
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This reasoning opened the door to the first arguments for why some con-
duct is harmful and should be prohibited and other conduct is beneficial or 
benign and should be permitted.53  In the earlier case law, however, the basis 
for drawing these distinctions was not well developed and courts struggled to 
identify a coherent framework for applying admittedly vague statutory lan-
guage.54  The passage of the Sherman Act itself fueled the uncertainty about 
when competition could be “ruinous” or when efficiency at scale was consid-
ered anticompetitive even when it delivered lower prices or more output.55  
The big trusts in oil, tobacco, beef, sugar, and gunpowder that inspired the 
Sherman Act, after all, had been overseeing industries that experienced con-
tinual price decreases in expanding markets.56  Yet, despite this increase in 
social welfare, some members of Congress nonetheless felt the need to pass a 
law that would rein in these firms—not because of their effect on consumers, 
but because of their effect on certain competitors.57  In this they were bolstered 
by the influential thinking of Louis Brandeis, who “was willing to burden 
consumers with higher prices if those prices provided an umbrella of protec-
tion for small business.”58   
Brandeis was far more concerned with the presumed exploitation of 
 
 53. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1910) (“The merely generic 
enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to which it refers and the absence of any definition of 
restraint of trade . . . [means it intended] to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by 
the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute, in 
every given case whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of the statute.”). 
 54. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 44; Arthur, supra note 30, at 1174 (“[T]he Court 
provided no analytical tools for trial judges untrained in economics to use in detecting ‘undue’ re-
straints in hard cases.”). 
 55. See Bork & Bowman, supra note 32, at 363–64 (footnote omitted) (“From its inception with 
the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890, antitrust has vacillated between the policy of preserving 
competition and the policy of preserving competitors from their more energetic and efficient rivals.”).  
 56. D.T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST: ECONOMIC THEORY AND LEGAL CASES 70, 
77, 86 (1972) (“Between 1870 and 1885 the price of refined kerosene dropped from 26 cents to 8 cents 
per gallon.  In the same period, the Standard Oil Company reduced the [refining] costs per gallon from 
almost 3 cents in 1870 to .452 cents in 1885.  Clearly, the firm was relatively efficient, and its effi-
ciency was being translated to the consumer in the form of lower prices for a much improved product, 
and to the firm in the form of additional profits. . . .  [A]t the very pinnacle of Standard’s industry 
‘control,’ the costs and the prices for refined oil reached their lowest levels in the history of the petro-
leum industry.”). 
 57. See Arthur, supra note 30, at 1171–72 (arguing that Congress made “real policy choices” in 
the Sherman Act by “ban[ning] cartels and monopolistic mergers, regardless of their social worth or 
economic efficiency,” but allowed other conduct so long as it did not involve “predatory practices”).  
 58. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 33 TOURO L. REV. 277, 314 (2017). 
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citizens through consumerism, than he was with the protection of consumers 
qua consumers: “Far-seeing organized capital secures [,with its tendency to 
cut prices,] . . . the co-operation of the short-sighted[,] unorganized consumer 
to his own undoing.  Thoughtless or weak, [the consumer] yields to the temp-
tation of trifling immediate gain, and, selling his birthright for a mess of pot-
tage[,] becomes himself an instrument of monopoly.”59  Indeed, Brandeis saw 
consumers as inherently unworthy of protection: “The Consumer,” wrote 
Brandeis, “is servile, self-indulgent, indolent, ignorant.”60 
Thus, following its formative phases, early twentieth-century antitrust 
law was interpreted largely as existing to protect “small dealers and worthy 
men”61 or, put more simply, to prevent “bigness.”62  And for much of the twen-
tieth century, antitrust doctrine focused on market structure and firm size, and 
condemned companies that were viewed as too large.63  In Aluminum Co. of 
America, the Second Circuit explicitly adopted the view that Congress passed 
the antitrust laws to allow courts to correct the coercive effects of large firms: 
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid 
monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are others, based 
upon the belief that great industrial consolidations are inherently un-
desirable, regardless of their economic results. . . .  [A]mong the pur-
poses of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggre-
gations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before 
them.64 
An approach that frames “big” corporations as bad, however, necessarily 
works to benefit “small” firms—even when they do not earn such success by 
 
 59. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 254 (1914). 
 60. Draft Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to George Henry Soule (Apr. 22, 1923), in 5 LETTERS OF 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 1921–1941: ELDER STATESMEN 92 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 
1st ed. 1978). 
 61. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897). 
 62. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS 109–11 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935) (expressing concern about large corporations and 
government). 
 63. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 64. Id. at 428–29.  Even here, however, Judge Hand observed that, notwithstanding a dislike for 
large economic powers, antitrust law could not be used to punish firms that had been successful.  Id.  
Thus, even in this period, marked by a less economically-grounded sensibility, courts instinctively 
sensed the destructive tendency of disregarded economic efficiency in antitrust analysis.  Id. at 446. 
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providing superior, lower-cost goods and services to consumers.65  Indeed, 
some viewed too much competition as harmful because it led to falling prices 
that could make it more difficult for small businesses to operate.66  The Second 
Circuit explained: “[A] competitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new 
all-time low in a market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch 
and will be a less effective competitive force.”67  In the name of protecting 
“helpless individuals” (small business owners) the courts therefore con-
demned conduct that lowered prices (thus harming consumers).68  “Big” was 
interpreted as “bad” during this period, even where administration of the an-
titrust laws to favor small business meant that “occasional higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and mar-
kets.”69 
The end result was a rudderless analysis that deployed the antitrust laws 
against perfectly procompetitive practices that benefited consumers.70  By ar-
bitrarily pegging the distinction between permissible and impermissible con-
duct to firm size, there was no meaningful way to distinguish procompetitive 
conduct from anticompetitive conduct.71  And, despite antitrust law’s ostensi-
ble focus on preserving competition, economic factors that could be used to 
judge firm performance were sometimes even treated as irrelevant.72 
 
 65. See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1967) (finding that the 
Clayton Act disfavors large corporations in favor of smaller firms because it seeks to promote and 
protect competition). 
 66. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 699–700 (1967). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 344. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 344, 346. 
 71. See id. at 329 (“Between these extremes, in cases such as the one before us, in which the 
foreclosure is neither of monopoly nor de minimis proportions, the percentage of the market foreclosed 
by the vertical arrangement cannot itself be decisive.  In such cases, it becomes necessary to undertake 
an examination of various economic and historical factors in order to determine whether the arrange-
ment under review is of the type Congress sought to proscribe.”). 
 72. See generally id. at 334–35 (listing factors to be considered in determining whether a horizontal 
merger is valid).  For example, a manufacturer who transferred title to a dealer or announced retail 
prices itself was treated differently under the antitrust laws than if that same conduct was affected by 
a resale price maintenance agreement.  See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306–
08 (1919) (stating that companies have the power to decide with whom they do business and can 
unilaterally terminate a business arrangement without violating the per se ban on retail price mainte-
nance). 
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B. The Antitrust Revolution: Toward a Coherent Economic Framework 
The unprincipled approach to antitrust adjudication that dominated 
through the early twentieth century eventually gave rise to serious criticism 
of, and ultimately to reflection on, the state of antitrust law.73  A rigorous de-
bate, catalyzed by Aaron Director at the University of Chicago, arose as schol-
ars and lawyers sought to develop a coherent, rigorous foundation for antitrust 
laws that would lead to an analytically tractable framework.74  Director was 
one of the first to observe that “bigness” was an insufficient gauge for deter-
mining when firms were acting anticompetitively and sought to implement a 
test that distinguished between those firms that were large as a result of suc-
cessfully outcompeting rivals and those that succeeded by undermining the 
competitive process.75 
Advocates for the status quo of politically administered antitrust, by con-
trast, believed that focusing on economic efficiency was inappropriate be-
cause the existence of large firms implied the need for a large government 
apparatus that would regulate those firms.76  Reviewing the spotty judicial 
history of the pursuit of the political aim of a fragmented economy filled with 
small firms, these advocates believed that “[w]hen it becomes necessary to 
subordinate the political objective of self-policing markets to the economic 
 
 73. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The 
sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [the antitrust laws], the Government always 
wins.”). 
 74. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND 
OTHER MATERIALS xvi (2d ed. 1981) (“Much of the economic analysis expounded in these notes is 
based on ideas first proposed by Director.  A number of these ideas were later developed and published 
by other economists whose work we . . . cite, but these citations conceal Director’s seminal role in the 
development of the economics of competition and monopoly presented in this book.”); Director & 
Levi, supra note 11, at 282–83; Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and 
Beyond: Time To Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 150 (2012) (“The historical 
accounts of the Chicago School of Antitrust uniformly agree on the central influence of Aaron Director 
and the Antitrust Law course he taught with Edward Levi at the University of Chicago.”); William H. 
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Ev-
identiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1229–30 (1989). 
 75. Page, supra note 74, at 1239–40. 
 76. Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, FORTUNE 135 (Aug. 1964), 
reprinted in 65 COLUM L. REV. 377, 383 (1965) (“[A]ntitrust operates to forestall concentrations of 
economic power which, if allowed to develop unhindered, would call for much more intrusive gov-
ernment supervision of the economy.  Reliance on competitive markets accommodates our interest in 
material well-being with our distrust of concentrations of political and economic power in private or 
governmental hands.”). 
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objective of increased efficiency, the decision must be made by Congress.”77  
Thus, in their view, regardless of whether antitrust eschewed efficiency to the 
detriment of consumers, society was clearly better served by limiting firm 
size, and it was up to Congress to say otherwise.78 
Reformers, on the other hand, observed that antitrust was marred by a 
history of internal contradictions where, with little appreciable rationale, 
courts would vacillate between preserving competition itself on the one hand, 
and protecting firms from more efficient rivals on the other.79  Moreover, the 
reformers recognized that economic efficiency as a measure of antitrust effi-
cacy was not a good in itself, but served as a signal of the revealed preferences 
of society.80  Therefore, an economic efficiency standard sought to maximize 
societal welfare and bring coherency to antitrust law.81  
While significant debate over appropriate rules and standards remained 
among antitrust reformers, some unifying themes emerged.  First, antitrust 
should be focused on fostering consumer welfare.82  The debates that started 
with Director and Bork forced legal scholars to consider the first principles 
that guided antitrust and to answer why competition is valuable.83  In other 
words, scholars, judges, and lawyers were forced to evaluate whether compe-
tition was a valuable good in itself or was instrumentally good because it could 
 
 77. Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 
COLUM L. REV. 422, 426 (1965). 
 78. See id. at 426–27 (noting cases in which Congress chose to exempt rate coordination from 
antitrust laws).  
 79. See Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, FORTUNE 138 (Dec. 
1963), reprinted in 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 363–64, 368 (1965) (“The difficulty with stopping a trend 
toward a more concentrated condition at a very early stage is that the existence of the trend is prima 
facie evidence that greater concentration is socially desirable.”). 
 80. Id. at 368 (“This increased efficiency is valuable to society at large, for it means that fewer of 
our available resources are being used to accomplish the same amount of production and distribu-
tion.”). 
 81. Id. at 368–69. 
 82. There is a debate—and confusion—over whether the exact welfare standard used in antitrust 
should be focused on “consumer welfare” or “total welfare.”  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984) (describing the difficulty in determining the welfare 
implications of various forms of business conduct).  The relevant point for our purposes here is that 
antitrust law came to incorporate a standard based solely on economic welfare while rejecting an am-
biguous socio-political standard that shifted based on enforcement preferences and judicial discretion.  
See infra Part II.C (describing the adoption of the modern consumer welfare standard). 
 83. See Tom Laskawy, Don’t Like Today’s Food Monopolies? Blame Robert Bork, GRIST (Dec. 
21, 2012), https://grist.org/food/dont-like-todays-food-monopolies-blame-robert-bork/ (discussing 
Robert Bork’s impact on antitrust debate and laws). 
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produce a better result.84  The answer that emerged was that competition leads 
to lower prices, expanded output, better quality, and more innovation—that is 
to say, it produces outcomes that benefit consumers.85  The precise number of 
competitors was only indirectly relevant in discovering whether the desirable 
result obtained from the competitive process.86 
The second major contribution of the antitrust reformers was to introduce 
the importance of economic theory, empirical evidence, and the error-cost 
framework in guiding antitrust enforcement decisions.87  By aligning legal 
theories of harm with economic theories regarding when and how conduct 
was anticompetitive, rigor and predictability were introduced into the antitrust 
enforcement process.88  Importantly, it is both theory and evidence that gov-
erns the enforcement process.89  If economic theory indicates that anticompet-
itive outcomes are possible, but empirical evidence shows that they are rarely 
observed in practice, the analysis is correspondingly adjusted.90 
“These . . . insights provided a coherent framework for analyzing alleg-
edly anticompetitive conduct—and specifically for distinguishing between 
pro[competitive] and anticompetitive conduct.”91  A good example of this ap-
proach is the evolution of predatory pricing claims to incorporate economic 
 
 84. See Laskawy, supra note 83. 
 85. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The as-
sumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that 
all elements of a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, 
are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers”); accord FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990). 
 86. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692 (“[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a 
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favor-
ing competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry.”); see, e.g., 
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2413 (2013) (illustrating how the specific number of firms does not have to 
be exact in order to make the competitive process produce desirable results for consumers). 
 87. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 82, at 10–11. 
 88. Id. at 9–10 (Erring on the side of permitting questionable firm conduct “would guide businesses 
in planning their affairs by making it possible for counsel to state that some things do not create risks 
of liability.  They would reduce the costs of litigation by designating as dispositive particular topics 
capable of resolution.”). 
 89. Id. at 10–12; see infra note 90. 
 90. Id. at 17–18.  Easterbrook posited a set of filters for determining whether courts should proceed 
with an antitrust case that included plaintiffs first demonstrating that market power exists, and a harm 
theoretically could occur, and then, subsequently whether the evidence of industry practice and actual 
firm behavior results in lowered output.  Id. at 19–39. 
 91. Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of 
Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 306 (2019). 
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learning and empirical reality.92  The empirical evidence demonstrates that 
predatory pricing is rarely effective.93  Firms that price below cost in order to 
drive competitors from the market suffer a loss on every sale they make, which 
generates the need to recover those losses during the post-predatory monopo-
lization of the market.94  But, as the firm raises prices above a competitive 
level, other firms are attracted to the market, which in turn risks nullifying the 
advantage the predatory firm sought to realize.95  Under an error-cost frame-
work, the theory presented—that a firm could drive competitors from the mar-
ket by pricing below cost—is tempered by the reality that the predatory firm 
is not likely to hold onto its advantage.96  Thus, without recoupment—that is, 
a demonstrated or likely ability to raise and maintain prices above a competi-
tive level—courts are unable to distinguish between procompetitive and anti-
competitive practices.97 
C. Modern Antitrust: Adoption of the Consumer Welfare Standard 
Today there is widespread, bipartisan support for the modern consumer 
welfare standard.98  That standard has been repeatedly embraced by majorities 
in Supreme Court decisions that recognize and embrace the economic foun-
dation that the standard provides.  In Reiter v. Sonotone, the Court recognized 
that the Sherman Act is a “consumer welfare prescription.”99  Later, in United 
States v. Baker Hughes, then-Judge Clarence Thomas—joined by then-Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg—wrote that “[e]vidence of market concentration simply 
 
 92. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 80–82 (1911) (noting that as far back as this 
case, the Supreme Court held that there was an offense when a firm merely lowered its prices with an 
intent to harm rivals).  Ultimately, the courts updated the laws as economists developed better theo-
retical and empirical work on predatory pricing.  See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 228–29 (1993). 
 93. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 144–45 
(1978). 
 94. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986). 
 95. Id. at 589. 
 96. Id.; see Wright, supra note 91, at 305–06 (discussing the implications of error-cost framework). 
 97. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 589; see Wright, supra note 91, at 305–06. 
 98. See Hearing #2 On Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century: Hearing Before 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 115 Cong. 2–4, 12 (2018) [hereinafter FTC Hearing #2] (Comments of the Amer-
ican Antitrust Institute) (noting that the FTC, an antitrust enforcement agency, employs the consumer 
welfare standard in its antitrust enforcement, and “[t]he agency’s work consistently attracts bipartisan 
support”). 
 99. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). 
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provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future compet-
itiveness.”100  And, more recently, in her confirmation hearings, Justice Kagan 
stated that “it is clear that antitrust law needs to take account of economic 
theory and economic understandings.”101 
In its adjudications, the Court has likewise been faithful to the goal of 
promoting consumer welfare.  In Brooke Group, the Court elaborated on pred-
atory pricing actions, aligning such claims under the Sherman Act and the 
Robinson-Patman Act.102  In reaching its holding, the Court reasserted the re-
quirement that predatory pricers must have some possibility for recoupment 
because, without such a requirement, “predatory pricing produces lower ag-
gregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced.”103 
In Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Court had occa-
sion to consider resale price maintenance restraints, and their effect on con-
sumer welfare.104  In moving resale price maintenance restraints from per se 
illegal to subject to a rule of reason analysis, the Court held that “[t]hough 
each side of the debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices to 
say here that economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications 
for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance.”105  Further, “[the prior 
approach to resale price maintenance restraints] hinders competition and con-
sumer welfare because manufacturers are forced to engage in second-best al-
ternatives and because consumers are required to shoulder the increased ex-
pense of the inferior practices.”106 
Recent criticisms of the consumer welfare standard, rooted in populist 
preferences for a return to political antitrust, ignore both this bipartisan sup-
port as well as the rigorous analysis and debate that led to the creation of this 
standard.107 
 
 100. United States v. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 101. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 82 (2010) (statement of Elena Kagan 
during her Supreme Court confirmation hearings). 
 102. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993). 
 103. Id. at 224. 
 104. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 (2007). 
 105. Id. at 889. 
 106. Id. at 902. 
 107. See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of 
Doubt?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition and Consumer Rights of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Barry Lynn).  See generally Lina M. Khan, 
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III. THE BENEFITS OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD 
Experience over the last fifty years demonstrates that the consumer wel-
fare standard has had a significant positive influence on antitrust jurispru-
dence and enforcement decisions.108  Today, the consumer welfare standard 
offers a workable, coherent, and objective framework that elegantly translates 
the core antitrust inquiry of whether there has been harm to competition into 
a simple question: does the conduct make consumers better or worse off?109  
In unifying antitrust under a singular objective, the consumer welfare standard 
abandons the use of vague tests that incorporate multiple, and often contra-
dictory, social and political goals that fail to meaningfully cabin discretion 
and thus ultimately permit decisionmakers to reach almost any result they de-
sire.110  Significantly, the consumer welfare standard grounds antitrust deci-
sions in economics and economic evidence, which has the dual virtues of re-
ducing the role of conjecture and supposition driven by personal preference, 
and of increasing the consistency of decisions across disparate political ad-
ministrations.111  Proposals to abandon the consumer welfare standard as the 
lodestar of the antitrust laws thus bear a heavy burden to deliver a similarly 




Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017) (arguing that the process of “gauging real 
competition in the twenty-first century marketplace . . . requires analyzing the underlying structure 
and dynamic of markets.”).  
 108. See generally infra Part III (describing the last fifty years of antitrust law under the consumer 
welfare standard). 
 109. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 2406–07 (discussing the goals of consumer welfare and 
why they are an improvement over the old, vague goals).  See generally infra Section III.A (describing 
how the consumer welfare standard is clear, consistent, and coherent).  
 110. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 2406–07.  See generally infra Section III.A (noting how 
the consumer welfare standard “offers an objective and concrete framework for evaluating whether a 
challenged conduct has harmed competition”). 
 111. Maurice Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 603 (2012). 
 112. See Joe Kennedy, Why the Consumer Welfare Standard Should Remain the Bedrock of Anti-
trust Policy, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1, 1 (Oct. 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meet-
ings/JU/JU05/20181212/108774/HHRG-115-JU05-20181212-SD004.pdf. 
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A. Consumer Welfare is a Clear, Consistent, and Coherent Legal 
Framework 
The consumer welfare standard is widely recognized across the political 
spectrum as the superior model for antitrust enforcement because it is clear, 
consistent, and coherent.113  Today, the consumer welfare standard is well-
developed, and its meaning and the evidence required to show harm is well-
established.114  As a result, a key benefit of the consumer welfare standard is 
that it offers an objective and concrete framework for evaluating whether a 
challenged conduct has harmed competition.115  It does so by examining a 
singular factor: whether consumers have been made better or worse off as a 
result of the conduct.116 
The consumer welfare standard therefore stands in sharp contrast to ear-
lier multi-pronged approaches that sought to weigh a variety of vague socio-
political factors that were at the decision-maker’s discretion and often led to 
inconsistent and incoherent results.117  This earlier approach had the result of 
weaponizing antitrust against the competitive process and, paradoxically, not 
only failed to promote competition but actively dissuaded lower prices, in-
creased innovation, and other competitive benefits. 
Critics of the consumer welfare standard argue that the decision to focus 
on the welfare of consumers (rather than some other group or on non-welfare 
objectives) is inherently a political decision and therefore no more justified 
 
 113. See, e.g., Deborah Garza, Remarks on “Modernization of Antitrust Law – Private and Public 
Enforcement and Abuses–Europe and the U.S.,” U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 29, 2008), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/speech/remarks-modernization-antitrust-law-private-and-public-enforcement-and-
abuses-europe-and (“Even the most passionate critics of current enforcement policy recognize the 
constraining influence of existing case law and, importantly, the substantial degree of consensus that 
exists today around most aspects of antitrust policy—a consensus forged on a solid foundation of 
economic learning. . . .  We won’t return to what antitrust enforcement looked like 40 years ago.”). 
 114. Cristine S. Wilson, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Luncheon Keynote Address at the 
George Mason Law Review 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium: Antitrust at the Crossroads? (Feb. 15, 
2019), in FTC.GOV, Feb 2019, at 1 (“Under the consumer welfare standard, business conduct and 
mergers are evaluated to determine whether they harm consumers in any relevant market.  Generally 
speaking, if consumers are not harmed, the antitrust agencies do not act.”). 
 115. Id. at 16. 
 116. See Garza, supra note 113 (“[A]gencies should give substantial weight to evidence demon-
strating that a merger will enhance consumer welfare by enabling the merging firms to increase inno-
vation.”). 
 117. See supra Section II.A. 
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than alternative tests.118  There are at least two errors with this position.  First, 
the decision to adopt the consumer welfare model is political only in the sense 
that every policy decision is a political decision.119  That is neither remarkable 
nor interesting for assessing the benefits of the consumer welfare standard.120  
The more important question is whether the consumer welfare standard, as 
applied, is better or worse than alternative tests at minimizing the discretion 
of a decisionmaker and therefore the potential influence of politics and rent-
seeking in antitrust decisions.121  Significantly, what experience shows is that 
because the consumer welfare model is clear and objective, it cannot easily be 
contorted by a decisionmaker who may be motivated by a desire to pick win-
ners and losers in a specific case.122  The singular focus on consumer welfare 
thus creates a predictable methodology that leads to more consistency across 
different antitrust cases and to treating similarly situated parties equally under 
the law.123  Indeed, by exporting the consumer welfare standard to other juris-
dictions around the world, the United States has helped to foster the rule of 
law and limited the use of antitrust to promote protectionist goals.124 
Second, although the consumer welfare standard may be imperfect, it is 
by far the best available antitrust framework because it maximizes the welfare 
 
 118. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at  2–3 (noting that opponents to the consumer welfare standard 
argue that large firms “concentrate political power into the hands of a fortunate few, thereby under-
mining democracy”). 
 119. Wilson, supra note 114, at 3. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 111, at 574–77 (questioning whether the consumer welfare 
method is actually more objective because “consumer welfare” has yet to be explicitly defined). 
 122. Wilson, supra note 114, at 10 (explaining that distortion is much easier  in other antitrust mod-
els). 
 123. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 5 (explaining that the consumer welfare standard is important 
because it has “freed companies from having to worry that they will become antitrust targets even if 
they do not engage in clear anticompetitive behavior such as price fixing or enter into mergers that 
violate the government’s rough guidelines regarding market concentration”). 
 124. See, e.g., A. Neil Campbell & J. William Rowley, The Internationalization of Unilateral Con-
duct Laws—Conflict, Comity, Cooperation and/or Convergence?, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 267, 272–73 
(2008) (“The Chicago School played a major role in reversing traditional interventionist views about 
vertical pricing and distribution practices by developing arguments as to why such activities rarely are 
a cause for [antitrust] concern.  William Kovacic . . . has also documented the complementary contri-
butions of the Harvard School, based largely on considerations related to administrability and the in-
stitutional capacity of courts and enforcement agencies, which have combined with the Chicago 
School to provide a ‘double helix’ of intellectual support for a restrained approach towards dominant 
firm conduct.”). 
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of all Americans.125  Alternative tests pick between different groups or classes 
of people or, worse yet, allow decisionmakers to make those distributional 
choices based on personal preference.126  Not all Americans are small business 
owners or have the same social policy preferences as a decisionmaker.  But 
every American is a consumer.  And therefore, all Americans benefit from 
maximizing consumer welfare.  The new populist antitrust movement aims to 
address a wide range of non-welfare policy preferences through antitrust be-
cause it is a convenient and potentially expeditious tactic for implementing 
progressive policies.127  But as history shows, these distributional decisions 
are inherently political; they are not well-suited for law enforcement agencies 
and judges; and they are better achieved through the legislative efforts of 
elected officials.128 
Importantly, the clarity of the consumer welfare standard does not require 
promoting an overly narrow test that is unable to incorporate key evidence 
relevant to assessing harm to competition.129  Critics of the consumer welfare 
standard frequently assert that it is too narrowly focused only on price and 
therefore is unable to assess the full context of a conduct’s effect on competi-
tion.130  They claim that the narrow focus on price leads to many types of 
conduct going unchallenged and therefore requires a fundamental shift to a 
 
 125. John Kirkwood, The Goals of Antitrust: The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and 
Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2459–60 (2013); see also 
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 3 (“[Antitrust] experts argue that the consumer welfare standard, properly 
defined, protects all counterparties from an excess of market power.  It incorporates nonprice harms 
to consumers, such as lower quality, reduced variety, or slower innovation.  It gives regulators the 
power to look at the effect of the monopsony power on other sellers, including on workers, and allows 
antitrust agencies to consider the effect of an action on innovation.”). 
 126. See Wilson, supra note 114, at 8–9 (explaining the “five different welfare standards that could 
be applied in antitrust analysis”). 
 127. See Client Memo, supra note 4, at 2 (“Today’s emerging antitrust populism movement is a 
reaction to this post-Chicago status quo, which the movement criticizes as having resulted in under-
enforcement, industry concentration, and greater wealth inequality. . . .  [T]his loose-knit coalition 
promotes the incorporation of factors currently not included in antitrust analysis.  These factors include 
loss of employment, increase in political influence, economic inequality, and impact on startup com-
panies.”). 
 128. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of Con-
sistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 222–
23 (2010) (explaining that there is almost universal agreement “that the Court should answer questions 
of antitrust law by promoting consumer welfare and economic efficiency and not by making political 
judgments about economically irrelevant matters”). 
 129. See Wilson, supra note 114, at 5 (explaining how the consumer welfare standard is adminis-
tered).  
 130. Id. 
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new test.131  These arguments are either disingenuous or represent a profound 
misunderstanding of the robustness of the consumer welfare standard.  In re-
ality, as discussed below, a long list of cases shows that the consumer welfare 
standard considers a host of factors beyond price, including quantity, variety, 
quality, and innovation.132  While it is not always easy to assess non-price 
factors, these factors fall well within the consumer welfare standard, and there 
exist numerous, sophisticated economic tools to evaluate whether a chal-
lenged conduct harms consumers on balance.133 
B. Consumer Welfare Tethers Decisions to Economics and Economic 
Evidence 
A key feature of the consumer welfare standard is that it institutionalizes 
an economics-based approach to competition policy.134  At its core, the con-
sumer welfare standard takes antitrust law’s mandate of protecting competi-
tion and gives it meaning through the common language of economics.135  By 
tethering antitrust decisions tightly to modern economics, the consumer wel-
fare standard creates an evidence-based framework for distinguishing when 
conduct results in anticompetitive or procompetitive effects.136  Moreover, alt-
hough the consumer welfare standard offers a concrete framework for com-
petition analysis, it is flexible enough to incorporate developments in econom-
ics and learning regarding the likely effects of new commercial business 
practices and business models that would never have been contemplated by 
the drafters of the antitrust laws.137 
The consumer welfare standard is tethered to economics in at least two 
 
 131. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 2 (stating that those who challenge the consumer welfare 
standard argue that a “predominant focus on consumers—and specifically prices—blinds antitrust reg-
ulators to other market impacts that can come about through mergers and other behavior”). 
 132. See Wilson, supra note 114, at 5–6 n.32. 
 133. Id.; see supra Section II.C (explaining how the Court has been incorporating the consumer 
welfare standard into its analyses successfully for years). 
 134. See Wilson, supra note 114, at 9. 
 135. Id. at 4. 
 136. As D.C. Circuit Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg explained, the “increasing embrace of the eco-
nomic approach to antitrust law, which—relative to approaches based upon amorphous sociopolitical 
goals—limits liability to those relatively few business practices truly inimical to consumers.”  Gins-
burg, supra note 128, at 219. 
 137. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Opening Remarks 
of the Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention: The Future of Antitrust: New Challenges to 
the Consumer Welfare Paradigm and Legislative Proposals (Nov. 14, 2019). 
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significant ways.  First, the goal of promoting consumer welfare ultimately 
informs what type of liability rules a court should apply in any particular case 
depending on the specific conduct at issue.138  By relying on economic theory 
and empirical evidence, the consumer welfare standard allows courts to apply 
filters and presumptions as part of liability rules that decrease the probability 
of error and increase the probability that antitrust benefits consumers.  Second, 
in cases requiring a more detailed assessment, the goal of promoting consumer 
welfare influences the factors a court will examine and how those factors are 
weighed against each other.139  The emergence of the consumer welfare stand-
ard has driven significant advances in antitrust economics and spurred debate 
about economic theories, empirical research, and the sufficient conditions for 
concluding the presence of anticompetitive conduct.140  Indeed, antitrust eco-
nomics has developed significantly since courts first adopted the consumer 
welfare standard, providing an increasingly insightful basis for decisions.141 
The consumer welfare standard’s inherent economic framework has also 
resulted in antitrust decisions and enforcement efforts being remarkably con-
sistent across administrations.142  While enforcement may change on the mar-
gin based upon the agency leadership, the economic approach to antitrust pre-
vents wild swings in enforcement based on ideology.143 
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE EMPIRICAL CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE 
UNDERPINNING THE POPULIST ANTITRUST MOVEMENT144 
The populist antitrust movement argues vociferously for abandoning the 
well-established consumer welfare standard.145  To many within this move-
ment, the consumer welfare standard is an impediment to successful antitrust 
enforcement and to the achievement of socio-political goals such a regime 
 
 138. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? An-
swer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 343 (2010); see also 
supra note 136. 
 139. See Salop, supra note 138, at 343; see also supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra Part I–II. 
 141. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 5. 
 142. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION WORKLOAD STATISTICS (2009–2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download (DOJ Antitrust Division enforcement statistics 
showing consistency across years 2009–2018). 
 143. Id. 
 144. This section draws in part from Wright et al., supra note 91.  
 145. Id. at 296. 
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may foster.146  As such, they argue that the consumer welfare standard should 
not be allowed to persist.  This line of argument views with the rosiest of 
glasses the well-trod history, described above, of antitrust enforcement pre-
consumer welfare standard—which experts, scholars, Nobel Laureates, 
judges and Supreme Court Justices across the political spectrum have recog-
nized to be a disaster that undermined fundamental principles of our democ-
racy, including the rule of law.147 
Nonetheless, populist antitrust proponents advocate returning to this pre-
consumer welfare standard world.148  Some of the many benefits of the con-
sumer welfare standard—and the commensurate costs of abandoning this 
standard—are described above.149  This section explores the empirical evi-
dence upon which populists rely when arguing to abandon the consumer wel-
fare standard.150 
A threshold question raised by the populist movement’s call to abandon 
the consumer welfare standard is whether this standard is systematically 
flawed such that abandoning it is warranted.151  The move to reject a standard 
that has been uniformly embraced by the Supreme Court and the lower courts 
for decades should be supported by clear economic consensus that the stand-
ard is doing more harm than good.152  In other words, strong empirical support 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (“The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always 
wins.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (1978) 
(finding the collection of socio-political goals at the time to be “mutually incompatible”); GEORGE J. 
STIGLER, THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS 41–42 (1982) (emphasizing the “lack 
of enthusiasm, and . . . downright hostility, with which economists greeted the Sherman Act”); Neil 
W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 
ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 177 (2007) (explaining how the “‘social and political values’ paradigm of the 
1960s and 1970s . . . proved standardless and unduly hostile to business”); Bork & Bowman., supra 
note 32, at 364 (explaining how “a fundamental and widespread misconception of the nature and vir-
tues of the competitive process. . . .  [C]oupled occasionally with real hostility toward the free market” 
led to “the result that in crucial areas the doctrines of antitrust are performing a 180-degree turn away 
from competition”); Ginsburg, supra note 128, at 217 (“Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court 
simply did not know what it was doing in antitrust cases.”); Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 34, at 44 
(internal citations omitted) (“Most economists in the late 19th century scorned the Sherman Act.”); 
Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 86, at 2405 (“The Court interpreted the Sherman and Clayton Acts to 
reflect a hodgepodge of social and political goals, many with an explicitly anticompetitive bent . . . .”). 
 148. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 294. 
 149. See supra Part III. 
 150. See infra Part IV. 
 151. See Wright et al., supra note 91, at 314. 
 152. Id. at 362–65, 295 n.6. 
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should exist for the populist movement’s allegations that the consumer wel-
fare standard is not doing what it purports to do, that it is, in any event, at-
tempting to maximize the wrong set of values, and that wholesale retargeting 
of antitrust enforcement would achieve the goals the populist movement has 
identified.153 
Thus far, however, the populist antitrust movement has not demonstrated 
such a sound economic basis.154  The evidence upon which it relies is mixed, 
at best.155  At most, it calls into question the level of enforcement under the 
consumer welfare standard, not the utility of the standard itself.156  As an ini-
tial matter, then, rejecting the consumer welfare standard today would risk all 
the observed benefits of the standard without compelling evidence of an actual 
problem—and with no persuasive reason to believe the proffered solutions 
would enhance outcomes.157 
Populist antitrust supporters make numerous assertions and policy pro-
posals.158  Some of the most frequently articulated include: (1) concentration 
is increasing, competition has weakened, and weak antitrust enforcement is to 
blame; (2) “lax antitrust enforcement” has allowed prices to increase and out-
put to decrease; and (3) increased antitrust activity would reduce economic 
inequality.159  This section addresses each claim in turn.160 
A. Faulty Claim 1: Concentration Has Increased and Competition Has 
Decreased—And the Consumer Welfare Standard Is to Blame 
One of the populist movement’s primary critiques is that the consumer 
welfare standard it to blame for the purported increase in industry concentra-
tion and the resulting assertion that competition has diminished.161 
To begin, there is in fact no rigorous economic support for claims that 
high concentration levels are a strong indicator of harm to competition or that 
 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. at 350–51. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 347. 
 157. Id. at 362–65. 
 158. Id. at 314. 
 159. Id. at 314, 350–51. 
 160. See infra Section IV.A–C. 
 161. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 314. 
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they should trigger a presumption of such harm in antitrust analysis.162 
For example, Professor Joshua Wright states: 
As it stands, there is no empirical foundation on which to conclude 
that monopoly power is rising.  To the extent that markups are in-
creasing, other studies show that output has increased and that qual-
ity-adjusted prices have remained stable.  Claims that concentration 
has increased at least find somewhat consistent empirical support, alt-
hough the extent of those changes are up for debate.  There is no re-
liable empirical basis, however, to support the inference that the 
United States economy has experienced a systematic increase in mar-
ket power.163 
Indeed, this has been true since at least the 1970s: 
[T]he studies done to date strongly indicate that there is little or no 
significant correlation between industrial concentration and corpo-
rate profits.   
 To be sure, if one selects a particular year with peculiar character-
istics, the figures can be made to appear otherwise, but in general, 
over a significant period of time, this lack of correlation seems well 
substantiated.  
 . . . . 
 Indeed, one thing on which there is unequivocal agreement among 
economists . . . is that monopoly rates of return are realized regularly 
in some of the least-concentrated industries imaginable: those for per-
sonal services.  
 
 162. Id. at 318–24.  In that regard, it should be noted that recent studies cast doubt on the idea that 
industry concentration has increased in the United States.  See, e.g., Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban, Pierre-
Daniel Sarte & Nicholas Trachter, Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration, 
PRINCETON 1, 1–15 (Jan. 2020), https://www.princeton.edu/~erossi/DTNLC.pdf (showing that while 
concentration may have increased at a national level, it has decreased at a local level). 
 163. Joshua D. Wright, Towards a Better Understanding of Concentration: Measuring Merger Pol-
icy Effectiveness, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 14 (Jun. 2018), https://one.oecd.org/docu-
ment/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)69/en/pdf .  
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 . . . .  
 In the industrial sector on the other hand, where remedies for un-
proved problems abound, monopoly rates of return, when they do oc-
cur, seem unlikely to persist for a significant period of time.164 
Instead, such assertions are based on a simple inference of competitive 
effects from market structures, and the unsupported assumption that an in-
crease in concentration can mean only a reduction in competition.165  The 
problem is that no such inference can be made: “[I]t is presumptuous to con-
clude . . . that markets populated by fewer firms perform less well or offer 
competition that is less intense.”166  As Yale Brozen so aptly put it back in 
1978: 
Industries have become concentrated where that was the road to 
lower costs.  It is these lower costs that have created temporary, 
above-average profitability in concentrated industries when it has oc-
curred.  Where concentration was not the road to lower costs, indus-
tries have remained unconcentrated.  The market has worked surpris-
ingly well, where it has been permitted, to conserve our resources and 
maximize our output.  The antitrust agencies[’] concentration on 
concentration in recent years is misdirected and should cease.167 
Properly considered, a superficial increase in concentration is just as con-
sistent with an increase in competition as with a decrease; the contrary 
claim—that there is a clear causal link between increased concentration and 
reduced competition—simply disregards the weight of economic evidence.168  
 
 164. Henry G. Manne, Testimony on the Industrial Reorganization Act before the United States 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly (Apr. 1974), in Henry 
G. Manne & Geoffrey A. Manne, Henry G. Manne: Testimony on the Proposed Industrial Reorgani-
zation Act of 1973–What’s Hip (in Antitrust) Today Should Stay Passé, INT’L CTR. FOR L. & ECON. 1, 
15–16 (2018). 
 165. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 318–24. 
 166. HAROLD DEMSETZ, The Intensity and Dimensionality of Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE BUSINESS FIRM: SEVEN CRITICAL COMMENTARIES 137, 140–41 (1995). 
 167. Yale Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 826, 856 (1978) (em-
phasis added). 
 168. See also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Philadelphia National Bank: Bad Econom-
ics, Bad Law, Good Riddance, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 381, 384 (2015) (noting that, during revision 
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010, the FTC and DOJ were pressed by economists to aban-
don structural presumptions as they were poor indicators of market power). 
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Put simply: market share and industry concentration are poor predictors of 
competitive effects.169 
 In short, there is no well-defined “causal effect of concentration 
on price,” but rather a set of hypotheses that can explain observed 
correlations of the joint outcomes of price, measured markups, mar-
ket share, and concentration. . . . 
 Some of the recent literature on concentration, profits, and 
markups has simply reasserted the relevance of the old-style struc-
ture-conduct-performance correlations.  For economists trained in 
subfields outside industrial organization, such correlations can be at-
tractive.  Our own view, based on the well-established mainstream 
wisdom in the field of industrial organization for several decades, is 
that regressions of market outcomes on measures of industry struc-
ture like the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index should be given little 
weight in policy debates.  Such correlations will not produce infor-
mation about the causal estimates that policy demands.170 
The fact is that economists know very little about the relationships among 
market structure, firm size, competition, profits, prices, entrepreneurship, and 
innovation.171  Market shares and structural presumptions are not capable of 
predicting competitive effects and, thus, of specifying optimal policy 
choices.172 
In particular, in markets where competition occurs significantly through 
innovation, the effect of increased concentration on competitiveness is 
 
 169. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
 170. Steven T. Berry, Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter? Les-
sons from Empirical Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 44, 48 (2019); see also, e.g., Luke 
M. Froeb, Former Dir., Fed. Bureau of Economics, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Summit at Como: A 
Discussion of Competition Policy, Law and Economics: From Theory to Praxis: Quantitative Methods 
in Merger Control 6 (Oct. 30, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_state-
ments/theory-praxis-quantitative-methods-merger-control/041030como.pdf. 
 171. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); 
Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989).  
 172. See Froeb, supra note 170, at 6. 
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ambivalent, at best.173  Where effective competition requires significant up-
front investment and where economies of scale predominate (because of these 
high fixed costs),174 the assumption that concentration leads to reduced com-
petition is especially misguided. 
Excessive reliance on obsolete, market-share-based analysis to evaluate 
antitrust practices is tantamount to a rejection of modern antitrust principles 
and the economic learning that undergirds them.175  Moreover, such an analy-
sis is likely to lead to decisions that reduce rather than promote consumer 
welfare and the public interest.176  “This approach faces severe measurement 
problems and worse conceptual problems.  As we will explain, there are nu-
merous, quite different economic scenarios, with different welfare implica-
tions, which can result in a positive correlation between industry concentra-
tion and [price, or] markups.”177 
As evidence of the purported increase in concentration underpinning 
these alleged defects, promoters of populist antitrust frequently cite studies 
that examine high-level industry designations (often based upon NAICS 
codes) and find, for instance, the fifty largest firms in a broad industry sector 
 
 173. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the Competition-
Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 206 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2006) (“There is little evidence that there is an optimal degree of competition to promote R&D.  
Empirical studies that use market concentration as a proxy for competition fail to reach a robust con-
clusion about the relationship between market concentration and R&D when differences in industry 
characteristics, technological opportunities, and appropriability are taken into account.”); Michael L. 
Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 22 (2007) (“The litera-
ture addressing how market structure affects innovation (and vice versa) in the end reveals an ambig-
uous relationship in which factors unrelated to competition play an important role.”); J. Gregory Sidak 
& David F. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 581, 588 
(2009) (“Despite 50 years of research, economists do not appear to have found much evidence that 
market concentration has a statistically significant impact on innovation.”); Douglas H. Ginsburg & 
Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 
(2012) (“To this day, however, the complex relationship between static product market competition 
and the incentive to innovate is not well understood. . . .  [E]conomic theory does not support a confi-
dent conclusion as to which antitrust policies will elicit a higher rate of innovation.”). 
 174. See also Mark A. Lemley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 595 (1998) (“Economies of scale frequently occur in industries charac-
terized by high fixed costs.”).  See generally Joseph P. Kendrick, Comment, Does Sound Travel in 
Cyber Space?, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 39, 46–47 (2004) (discussing the basics of economies 
of scale and the indivisibilities giving rise to them). 
 175. Berry et al., supra note 170, at 44–45. 
 176. Id. at 47–48. 
 177. Id. at 45. 
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increased in revenue share over a recent ten-year period.178  From this evi-
dence, populist antitrust supporters conclude that allegedly lax antitrust en-
forcement over the last thirty years has led to a highly concentrated, uncom-
petitive economy.179 
This logic has several critical flaws.  One is that competition and concen-
tration are inherently different and inherently in opposition.180  Thus, accord-
ing to this logic, increased concentration and reduced competition are two 
separate claims that must be measured differently.181  Another flaw is that the 
ability to measure the fifty largest firms in a sector itself demonstrates there 
are at least fifty competitive firms, which would seem, in the abstract, to be a 
not-insignificant number of firms.182  Furthermore, this increased concentra-
tion is not indicative of the aggregate economy in the United States.  For ex-
ample, high concentration has been apparent in only “three broad [industry] 
sectors[:] services, wholesale, and retail[,]” whereas in other sectors, such as 
manufacturing, concentration has fallen.183  A related logical flaw is that the 
industry-level designations upon which these studies rely have little to no util-
ity for antitrust purposes.  They are far too broad to offer insight into actual 
market power.  Authors of the concentration studies themselves, leading econ-
omists across the political spectrum, and officials at the antitrust agencies all 
acknowledge this basic point.184 
 
 178. See, e.g., Jason Furman, Chairman, President’s Council of Econ Advisers & Peter Orszag, Vice 
Chairman, Corp. & Inv. Banking at Citi & Non-Resident Fellow in Econ. Studies at the Brookings 
Inst., Presentation at “A Just Society” Centennial Event in the Honor of Joseph Stiglitz at Columbia 
University: A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality 11 (Oct. 16, 2015), 
http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/teaching/FurmanOrszag15.pdf; see also Business in America: Too 
Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2016/ 
03/26/too-much-of-a-good-thing (arguing that American firms’ profit levels are too high, indicating a 
need for added competition within overly-concentrated industries). 
 179. See Furman & Orszag, supra note 178, at 12. 
 180. See Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Im-
portance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783, 808–09 (2018). 
 181. Id. at 808–12; see also Business in America, supra note 178. 
 182. See Furman & Orszag, supra note 178, at 11. 
 183. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, The Industrial Revolution in Services 4 (Mar. 
17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Princeton University), https://www.princeton.edu/ 
~erossi/IRS.pdf. 
 184. See, e.g., United States, Hearing on Market Concentration, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV, May 27, 2018, at 2, para.1, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2018)59/en/pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. Antitrust Agencies OECD Submission] (“Academics and journalists recently made 
claims of increasing concentration throughout the U.S. economy. . . .  The U.S. Department of Justice 
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Consider, for instance, that the “Retail Trade” designation, which is used 
in several studies by populist authors,185 includes over 1.5 million United 
States businesses.186  It also covers an expansive breadth of businesses, such 
as new and used car dealers, boat dealers, furniture stores, floor covering 
stores, household appliance stores, electronics stores, supermarkets and other 
grocery (but not convenience) stores, fish and seafood markets, various cloth-
ing stores, jewelry stores, sporting goods stores, musical instrument and sup-
plies stores, florists, art dealers, tobacco stores, and more.187  This designation, 
in other words, includes numerous retail segments that clearly do not compete 
with one another; if one were looking to buy fresh seafood, for example, a 
tobacco store is not a suitable place to shop.188  Simply identifying that con-
centration across these vastly different retail segments has increased in the 
aggregate cannot illuminate our understanding of actual market power.189 
As a point of comparison to the expansive “Retail Trade” designation, 
courts and antitrust agencies have identified the following—far narrower—
relevant antitrust markets in recent cases falling under this broader umbrella: 
 
(Department) and Federal Trade Commission (collectively, the U.S. Agencies) find the claims of in-
creasing concentration are unsupported by data for meaningful markets.”); Carl Shapiro, Panel at the 
Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State: Is There a Concentration Problem in Amer-
ica? What Do the Data Tell Us? Trends in Concentration and Competition (Mar. 27, 2017), https://pro-
market.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Is-There-a-Concentration-Problem-in-America.pdf (noting 
that the CEA “[s]omewhat embarrassingly . . . looked at the 50-firm concentration ratio in two-digit 
industries” and that he was not sure what “IO [industrial organization] economist [would] think that[] 
very informative regarding market power”); Joe Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Welcome 
Remarks at FTC Hearing #1, supra note 16, Session 1: The Current Landscape of Competition and 
Consumer Protection Law and Policy (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-
video/video/ftc-hearing-1-competition-consumer-protection-21st-century-welcome (transcript availa-
ble at FTC.gov); see also Jonathan Baker, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton & Joshua D. Wright, 
Panel at the FTC Hearing #1, supra note 16, Session 2: Has the US Economy Become More Concen-
trated and Less Competitive: A Review of the Data (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/audio-video/video/ftc-hearing-1-session-2-has-us-economy-become-more-concentrated-less 
(with all economists acknowledging this point); Noah Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Pre-
pared Remarks before the United States Chamber of Commerce: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc 4–6 (Oct. 
17, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1416803/phillips_-_us_ 
chamber_of_commerce_10-17-18.pdf. 
 185. See, e.g., Furman & Orszag, supra note 178, at 11. 
 186. See Galston and Hendrickson, supra note 8. 
 187. Six Digit NAICS Codes & Titles, NAICS ASS’N, https://www.naics.com/six-digit-naics/? 
code=44-45 (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
 188. See Galston & Hendrickson, supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 189. See U.S. Antitrust Agencies OECD Submission, supra note 184, at 3, para. 4 (“Concentration 
is meaningless for competition analysis when measured in an economic sector much narrower or much 
broader than a relevant market.”); see also Wright et al., supra note 91, at 315–18. 
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• “premium, natural, and organic supermarkets[;]”190 
• “the sale and distribution of consumable office supplies to 
large B-to-B [business-to-business] customers[;]”191 and 
• “’[d]iscount general merchandise retail stores[,]’” meaning 
“small-format, deep-discount retailers that sell an assortment 
of consumables and non-consumables, including food, home 
products, apparel and accessories, and seasonal items, at 
prices typically under $10 (i.e., dollar stores) and the retailer 
Walmart.”192 
Although not themselves without flaws, these far-more-carefully deline-
ated antitrust markets underscore the limited utility of citing to industry-level 
designations within antitrust debates. 
Another threshold flaw in the populist logic is that it assumes concentra-
tion is per se bad and something that antitrust law should always condemn.  
As discussed above, however, economic theory and empirical work have de-
bunked this notion—and for good reason.193  Again, simply counting the num-
ber of firms in existence fails to shed any real light on the underlying compet-
itive dynamics of a given industry. 
Consider an Olympic example.  Followers of recent Summer Olympic 
Games might have noticed that the number of different Olympic gold medal 
winners in men’s swimming events have been lower of late—that is, gold 
medals in these events have become highly concentrated among fewer swim-
mers.  This concentration in men’s swimming event gold medals was largely 
the result of Michael Phelps winning an unprecedented twenty-three gold 
medals over four Olympic Games.194 
Simply observing that men’s swimming event gold medals became more 
concentrated, however, tells us nothing about how competitive these events 
were at each Olympic Games.  While it might have been the case that 
 
 190. F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 191. F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 127 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 192. Complaint at 5, In re Dollar Tree, Inc. & Family Dollar Stores, Inc., (No. C-4530) (July 2, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150702dollartreecmpt.pdf. 
 193. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 194. Andrew Gould, Michael Phelps Poses with 23 Olympic Gold Medals on ‘Sports Illustrated’ 
Cover, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 20, 2016), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2682937-michael-
phelps-poses-with-23-olympic-gold-medals-on-sports-illustrated-cover. 
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competition in this field was lower over the last sixteen years (maybe com-
petitors were just slower than average, making it easier to win gold), it might 
very well have been that competition was just as strong—if not stronger—
than ever.195  To understand the competitiveness of the field, we would have 
to examine several additional facts.  As it happens, the clear consensus is that 
Phelps faced an incredibly competitive field—he broke several world and 
Olympic records (including some of his own!) in his gold-medal-winning 
swims.196  So it was not a lack of competition, but the presence of a particu-
larly skilled competitor driving concentration.  Consider, then, that a rule pro-
hibiting concentration of men’s swimming event gold medals above a certain 
level (or, for instance, imposing upon a competitor with a certain percentage 
concentration a delayed start) might have prevented Phelps from competing 
in additional races—but this prohibition would have decreased competition 
in the event(s), not increased it. 
The same basic idea holds in economic competition.  An increase in con-
centration might be correlated with a decrease in competition, but it might 
also be the natural result of a healthy competitive process and consistent with 
constant or increasing competition.197  After all, successful firms are often 
successful for meritorious reasons.198  For example, increased concentration 
might be attributable to firms adopting new technologies that enable them “to 
scale production over a large number of establishments dispersed across 
space” (horizontal expansion across more locations).199  This results in firms 
exiting industries where they are less-efficient, or where the new technology 
is ineffective.200  In other words, increased concentration can be the result of 
an industry weeding out its less-efficient firms—the remaining firms are seen 
 
 195. Beat Knechtle et. al., The Age in Swimming of Champions in World Championships (1994–
2013): and Olympic Games (1992–2012): A Cross-Sectional Data Analysis, SPORTS 4, 20 (2016). 
 196. See Jesse Yomtov, Full List of Every Olympic Medal Michael Phelps has Won, USA TODAY 
SPORTS (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/rio-2016/2016/08/07/ 
michael-phelps-medals/88361712/. 
 197. Sharat Ganapati, Growing Oligopolies, Prices, Output, and Productivity, Ctr. For Econ. Stud, 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2 (Nov. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3030966 
(“[M]onopolies could be caused by innovation from ‘superstar’ firms or scale economies, leading to 
falling prices or increased output.”); see also Wright et al., supra note 91, at 318–24.  See generally 
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007); JEAN 
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1988). 
 198. See infra Section III.A.2 (developing evidence indicating concentration is not correlated with 
higher prices, but does correspond to increased output). 
 199. See Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, at 42. 
 200. Id. at 42–43. 
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as “superstar” firms.201  Thus, the rise in concentration is predominantly 
driven by top firms serving more localized markets.202  This means that com-
petition is increasing, not decreasing. 
This increase in industry-specific concentration does not necessarily re-
sult in an increase in concentration in the economy as a whole.203  This is 
partially because today’s top firms are more specialized than they used to be: 
“[t]he number of industries of a top 0.001% firm (relative to the average firm) 
fell from 35 in 1977 to 17 in 2013. . . .  [And industries of] a top 0.01% firm 
[fell from 21 in 1977 to 9 in 2013].”204  This results in a “decrease in the power 
of top firms relative to the economy as a whole, as the largest firms specialize 
more, and are dominant in fewer industries.”205 
Competition in labor markets is illustrative of this point.  Because top 
firms are now more specialized, local employment concentration has de-
creased, especially in the services, retail, and wholesale industry sectors.206  
This negates the claim that higher industry concentration leads to monopsony 
in labor markets.207  What appears to be happening instead is in fact the exact 
opposite; employment, in the industries with the greatest concertation at the 
national level, has increased.208  In fact, the industries in which top firm con-
centration increased had an employment share that “grew from 70% in 1977 
to 85% in 2013.”209  Increased concentration appears not to lead to increased 
 
 201. See generally David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, & John Van 
Reenan, The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. No. 
23396, 2019) (discussing the data and evidence behind “superstar firms”). 
 202. Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, at 4. 
 203. See Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, at 5 (“The ‘super-star’ firms of today’s economy 
are larger in their chosen sectors and have unleased productivity growth in these sectors, but they are 
not any larger as a share of the aggregate economy.”). 
 204. Id. at 17–18. 
 205. Geoffrey Manne, What if Rising Concentration Were an Indication of More Competition, Note 
Less?, TRUTH ON MARKET (Dec. 14, 2019), https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/12/14/what-if-rising-
concentration-were-an-indication-of-more-competition-not-less/. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Josh Bivens, Lawrence Mishelm & John Schmitt, It’s Not Just Monopoly and Monopsony: 
How Market Power Has Affected American Wages, ECON. POLICY INST., https://www.epi.org/publi-
cation/its-not-just-monopoly-and-monopsony-how-market-power-has-affected-american-wages/ 
(“[F]irm concentration in product markets (or monopoly power) . . . .  [Leads to] few[er] buyers of 
labor and a lack of credible competition from new entrants . . . . [Which results in] employer concen-
tration in labor markets (or monopsony power”).  But see Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, 
at 4 n.3. 
 208. Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, at 9–10. 
 209. Id. 
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market power over labor, but instead to more competition among firms for 
labor.210 
In summation, market concentration can be viewed as an outcome of the 
competitive process.211  While market concentration may indicate the type or 
nature of competition that exists in an industry, it is equally possible that the 
type of competition can generate the market concentration.  This is why the 
U.S. deliberately opted to foster a free-market economy and not to outlaw 
monopolies per se.212  In fact, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have 
repeatedly recognized that the draw of monopoly profits is what drives firms 
to enter, compete, and innovate.213  Counting firms and calculating concentra-
tion cannot by itself distinguish meritorious wins from suspicious ones.  In 
other words, identifying an increase in concentration—particularly an in-
crease in industry-level concentration rather than in antitrust-market concen-
tration—is not in any way the same as identifying a failure of antitrust en-
forcement. 
A corollary is that altering antitrust rules to respond to concentration, 
alone, threatens to undermine competitive and anticompetitive outcomes 
alike.  It would punish the victorious firm for winning and successfully grow-
ing larger—which both economic learning and the courts tell us is a poor out-
come.214 
 
 210. See generally id. at 4 n.3, 9–10 ("Firms throughout the size distribution increase employment 
in sectors with increasing concentration, not only the top 10% firms in the industry, although by defi-
nition the increase is larger among the top firms.”). 
 211. Id. at 4–5. 
 212. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly 
under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or 
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“To safeguard 
the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is 
accompanied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”). 
 213. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system.  The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.”); see also Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2009) (quot-
ing same); Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy Med. Ctr. of Durango, 582 F.3d 1216, 
1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting same). 
 214. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (sitting as the 
court of last resort, the Second Circuit explained, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to 
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B. Faulty Claim 2: Weak Antitrust Enforcement Has Allowed Prices to 
Increase and Output to Decrease 
Another assertion populist antitrust supporters regularly make is that 
prices have increased and output has decreased.215  Again, the evidence here 
is mixed at best. 
The movement’s proponents claim increased monopoly power economy-
wide has led to increased prices for consumers.  One study by Jan De Loecker 
and Jan Eeckhout, for instance, purports to demonstrate an increase in 
markups since 1980, which they argue indicates market power has increased 
over this period.216  This study utilizes Compustat-compiled input and output 
data for firms across the U.S. economy to calculate firm-level markups, ex-
amining measures of sales, input expenditure, capital stock information, in-
dustry activity classifications, and accounting data measuring profitability and 
stock market performance.217 
While this study purports to demonstrate an increase in markups and, 
therefore, an increase in market power, there are several problems with this 
methodology and reasoning.218  Fundamentally, industrial organization eco-
nomics literature has clearly established that profit margins, alone, are not re-
liable evidence of market power.219  Additionally, it is clear that increased 
markups, alone, are not reliable evidence of price increases.  To understand 
whether higher markups translated to higher prices, we would need to under-
stand additional factors, such as whether marginal costs have changed.220  If, 
for example, marginal costs decreased, markups could increase even if prices 
remained the same; indeed, depending upon how much marginal costs 
 
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”).  But see Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law 
and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 286 (1956) (criticizing early antitrust en-
forcement and the Court’s holding in Alcoa, specifically, noting, “[p]erhaps, then the successful com-
petitor can be turned upon when he wins, because he has been told not to compete.”). 
 215. See Director & Levi, supra note 214, at 290. 
 216. Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implica-
tions 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017), https://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w23687. 
 217. See id. at 3–4. 
 218. See id. at 14 (“Markups tell us that the margin of revenue over variable costs has increased.  
That does not necessarily imply that firms are making higher profits.”). 
 219. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & J. Gregory Sidak, The Misuse of Profit Margins to Infer Market 
Power, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 511, 511–12 (2013). 
 220. See Ganapati, supra note 197, at 2–3; see also Wright et al., supra note 91, at 320–22. 
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decreased, margins could increase even while prices decreased.221  Moreover, 
a trend toward higher markups does not necessarily indicate firm profits are 
likewise trending higher, as De Loecker and Eeckhout acknowledge.222  As 
they explain, a “technological change that reduces variable costs . . . [but] in-
creases fixed costs[,]” might result in increased markups but not increased 
profits.223 
In addition, higher markups might simply reflect a shift in the composi-
tion of firms within the economy.  Today, high-tech (and other) firms with 
low marginal costs but substantial R&D costs comprise a more significant 
percentage of the economy than they have historically.224  Consider, for in-
stance, a software company that spends a tremendous amount developing an 
innovative new software that consumers download on their personal devices.  
While the marginal cost of selling each new unit of software would be 
miniscule, the company—to stay in business—would need to charge a price 
that helped it recoup the costs incurred to create its innovative product.  The 
more firms within the economy employing this business model, the more we 
would expect to see higher markups, and so the less we could assume, based 
upon the existence of higher markups, alone, that those markups derive from 
increased market power. 
Aside from the methodological issues with these studies, there is the 
added complication that other work finds conflicting results.  Robert E. Hall, 
for instance (whose pioneering work in this area essentially created the field), 
finds no relationship between large-firm concentration and market power: 
“There is no cross-sectional support for the hypothesis of higher markup ratios 
in sectors with more very large firms and thus more concentration in the prod-
uct markets contained in those sectors[,]” and “no evidence that mega-firm-
intensive sectors have higher price/marginal cost markups.”225  Notably, while 
he finds no real evidence of increasing markups in less regulated sectors like 
Manufacturing or Transportation and Warehousing, Hall does find a fairly 
 
 221. See Bork & Sidak, supra note 219, at 518. 
 222. Loecker & Eeckhout, supra note 216, at 14. 
 223. Id.  
 224. See Hsieh & Rossi-Hansberg, supra note 183, at 36. 
 225. Robert E. Hall, New Evidence on the Markup of Prices over Marginal Costs and the Role of 
Mega-Firms in the US Economy 1, 16 (2018), at https://web.stanford.edu/~rehall/Evidence%20on% 
20markup%202018 [hereinafter Hall, New Evidence].  Note that he does find “some evidence that 
markups grew in sectors with rising mega-firm intensity.”  Id. at 1.  See generally Robert E. Hall, The 
Relation Between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry, 96 J. POL. ECON. 921 (1988) (explaining 
a “new method for estimating the ratio of price to marginal cost”). 
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strong trend of increasing markups in heavily regulated sectors like Finance 
and Insurance, and Health Care and Social Assistance—which is consistent 
with something other than concentration driving increased markups.226 
Others examining the effect of concentration upon prices likewise find 
results that conflict with the populist antitrust movement’s claims.  James 
Traina, for example, analyzes this same question, finding that whatever in-
creasing concentration there is, is not correlated with increased market power: 
[P]ublic-firm market power has not substantially increased in recent 
decades. . . .  [M]arkups for the universe of non-utility, non-financial 
US public firms. . . .  [I]ncreased only modestly since the 1980s.  
Moreover, this increase is within historical variation—measured 
markups have increased from 1980–2010 as much as they have de-
creased from 1950–1980.227 
Traina’s study attempts to correct for another flaw in De Loecker and 
Eeckhout’s methodology: namely, De Loecker and Eeckhout focus only on 
the cost of goods sold (“COGS”) facet of firms’ operating expenses, omitting 
the selling, general, and administrative expenses (“SGA”) facet.228  Traina ar-
gues that SGA is an increasingly significant share of variable costs for firms 
in the U.S. economy, and demonstrates that once SGA is incorporated into De 
Loecker and Eeckhout’s measure of cost, markups actually remain flat (or de-
cline).229  As Traina notes: 
The closest paper to this one is De Loecker and Eeckhout 
(2017). . . .  While they use similar data sources and methods, a key 
difference is this paper uses a better accounting measure of variable 
cost, which includes important components of costs omitted by ear-
lier work.  Specifically, this measure includes indirect costs of pro-
duction such as marketing and management, which are an increas-
ingly vital share of variable costs for firms.  Neglecting these costs 
meaningfully overstates both the level and growth in markups.  A 
 
 226. See Hall, New Evidence, supra note 225, at 15. 
 227. James Traina, Is Aggregate Market Power Increasing? Production Trends Using Financial 
Statements 1–2 (Stigler Ctr. For the Study of the Econ. And the St. U. of Chi. Sch. Of Bus., New 
Working Paper Series No. 17, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3120849. 
 228. See id. at 7 (explaining that because De Loecker and Eeckhout exclude SGA, they report a 
large increase in markups that would not be there if SGA was included). 
 229. Id. at 6–10. 
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significant contribution of this paper is to inform the debate on ag-
gregate market power by offering a starkly different conclusion from 
the main empirical result of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).230 
Similarly, Ganapati examines data from 1972–2012, and finds concentra-
tion issues do not lead to higher prices, but in fact correspond with increased 
output.231  He concludes that the concentrated industries he analyzes are con-
centrated not due to anticompetitive behavior, but “likely due to technical in-
novation or scale economies.”232  His findings are consistent with other work 
that finds that the trends in concentration populists condemn may, in fact, be 
related to changes in economies of scale and to their corresponding produc-
tivity improvements.233 
Other studies upon which populist antitrust proponents rely purport to 
identify higher prices using different metrics.234  One such regularly-cited 
study is John Kwoka’s meta-analysis of retrospective studies of mergers, joint 
ventures, and other horizontal arrangements.235  Here, Kowka compiles data 
covering more than 3,000 mergers and concludes the average price effect for 
the studied mergers is a 7.22% increase.236  His findings have, however, been 
called into serious question.  Experienced economists in the FTC’s Bureau of 
Economics, Michael Vita and David Osinski, identify several objections to 
Kwoka’s methodology and, accordingly, his findings.237  They explain why 
various methodological failings—including not using standard meta-analytic 
techniques to compute average price effects and standard errors, not weighting 
observations by their estimated variances (meaning all price estimates are 
treated the same regardless of their certainty), and omitting standard errors 
from his report—undermine Kwoka’s fundamental findings regarding price 
 
 230. Id. at 2. 
 231. Ganapati, supra note 197, at 13. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See, e.g., 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 171; TIROLE, supra note 
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 234. John Kwoka, The Changing Nature of Efficiencies in Mergers and in Merger Analysis, 60 
ANTITRUST BULL. 231, 233 (2015). 
 235. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
OF U.S. POLICY 4–5 (2015). 
 236. Id. at 110–12. 
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Critical Review, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 361–63 (2018). 
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effects.238 
The evidence upon which populist antitrust supporters rely in asserting 
that prices have increased is, accordingly, mixed at best.  The studies they cite 
often attempt to examine very important—but also difficult to measure—
questions.239  The limits of these studies must be acknowledged in any serious 
debate regarding the state of antitrust enforcement today.  While many of 
these studies offer good initial insights, they mostly identify areas for further 
research.  And in no case do they clearly identify systemic shortcomings in 
current antitrust enforcement efforts.240 
In addition to questionable empirical premises, the argument that we must 
abandon the consumer welfare standard because prices are higher and output 
is lower under this standard is in serious tension with remedies the populist 
antitrust movement proposes.  Each of the proposed remedies would, as de-
scribed above, diminish consumer welfare.  If, for instance, we adopted a pub-
lic interest standard, prices and output might be one concern—but employ-
ment, democracy, the environment, and inequality might be competing 
concerns.241  And lower prices, higher output, and product improvements 
would not have the trump card in the analysis they do today.242  Similarly, if 
 
 238. Id. at 363–64. 
 239. Id. at 361–63. 
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41, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3044730; John Van Reenen, Increas-
ing Differences Between Firms: Market Power and the Macro-Economy 21–23 (Fed. Res. Bank Kan. 
City 2018),  https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/sympos/2018/papersandhandouts/j
h%20john%20van%20reenen%20version%2020.pdf (showing that a rise in fixed costs due to invest-
ments in proprietary information technology—and not necessarily any anticompetitive conduct—cor-
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 241. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 885, 
885–86 (2012). 
 242. See Ginsburg, supra note 128, at 219. 
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we decided to ban vertical mergers or prohibit any transactions over a certain 
size, we would be preventing at least some transactions that would lower 
prices and increase output.  This would appear to be particularly likely in the 
case of banning vertical mergers, a move which empirical evidence indicates 
anticompetitive outcomes—i.e., higher prices or lower output—result only 
rarely.243  Consequently, it would lead to the perverse result of antitrust law 
deliberately fostering higher prices or lower output, meaning consumers 
would be less able to purchase products or services they desire.244 
Accordingly, even if prices and output have, in fact, trended in directions 
harmful to consumers, the better question to be asking is whether this is be-
cause enforcement under the consumer welfare standard is not at the optimal 
level.245  The consumer welfare standard focuses on just such factors—along 
with innovation, quality, and other consumer concerns.  If the goal is to lower 
prices and increase output, it is difficult to see what better standard could be 
adopted than one that makes these consumer concerns its sole focus. 
C. Faulty Claim 3: Increasing Antitrust Enforcement Would Reduce 
Inequality 
Populist antitrust supporters further note that income inequality in the 
United States has increased dramatically in recent decades, and proffer that 
 
 243. See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference 14 (Vanderbit 
U. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 05-12, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
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Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 2652 (2013). 
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lax antitrust enforcement is (to varying degrees) to blame.246  The general in-
tuition here is fairly easily stated: lenient antitrust enforcement allows firms 
to obtain market power, which allows them to reduce output, raise prices, and 
generate monopoly profits—all of which enriches shareholders.247  Sharehold-
ers are, by and large, in the top percentage of wealth and income distribution, 
so these increasing returns increase the wealth of the wealthiest and, thus, in-
equality.248 
Imbedded in this theory are a couple of key assumptions, both of which 
can be empirically tested.  First, that inequality is increasing.249  The evidence 
here suggests inequality is likely increasing, though the magnitude of this in-
crease is probably overstated.  Second, that increasing antitrust enforcement 
would reverse this trend.250  On the proffered causal link between antitrust 
enforcement and inequality, there is, so far, a notable dearth of empirical sup-
port or development. 
First, consider the evidence on inequality trends.251  Populist claims re-
garding increasing inequality largely rely upon analysis of the Gini coefficient 
for United States incomes over the last 50 years, which appears to show a 
steep increase in inequality.252  Examining the ratio of the share of United 
States income among the 5th quintile of income-earning households to the 
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& Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its Discon-
tents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 235–36 (2017) (“[M]arket power can be a powerful mechanism 
for transferring wealth from the many among the working and middle classes to the few . . . at the top 
of the income and wealth distribution.”); see also Wright et al., supra note 91, at 327–30. 
 249. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 327–30. 
 250. Baker & Salop, supra note 246, at 14. 
 251. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2016) 
(arguing that “[i]t is virtually impossible to calculate the net effect on wealth distribution from general 
increases or decreases in overall antitrust enforcement.”). 
 252. Baker & Salop, supra note 246, 1–3. 
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share among the 1st quintile of households likewise seems to show increasing 
inequality.253 
While these data points offer interesting insights, it is again important to 
understand their limitations.  As Robert Kaestner and Darren Lubotsky em-
phasize, for example, failing to account for government transfers and em-
ployee benefits—that presumably substitute, in part, for cash income—can 
meaningfully affect these kinds of inequality measures.254  One important ex-
ample they explore is that of healthcare benefits.  As healthcare costs have 
rapidly increased in recent years, omitting a measure of health insurance ben-
efits (provided by employers or by the government) could significantly affect 
ultimate inequality findings.  Kaestner and Lubotsky, in fact, analyze inequal-
ity measures accounting for this omission, and find that including health in-
surance benefits substantially lessens the difference between high-end and 
low-end incomes.255  They find the ratio of income between households at the 
90th percentile and the 10th percentile to be approximately 5.0 in 1995, 5.2 in 
2004, and 5.6 in 2012.256  So while their findings support the notion that ine-
quality is increasing, they also suggest that the trend is significantly smaller 
than reported. 
Examining household consumption trends tells a similar story.  Scholars 
have argued that consumption might be a superior measure of welfare, given 
a “closer link between consumption and well-being.”257  Consumption trends 
would also seem to be relevant when considering antitrust enforcement ef-
forts, as they offer more information regarding economic effects than isolated 
income or wealth measurements.  Examining household consumption over the 
last couple decades indicates that inequality is increasing but at a muted rate. 
Accordingly, the evidence does seem to indicate inequality is increasing 
by some amount.  Potentially more-accurate measures of income and welfare, 
however, suggest this trend is not as significant as populists claim.258  So, the 
first assumption in this particular populist theory appears to be valid, if often 
 
 253. Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated Aug. 27, 
2019), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-ine-
quality.html. 
 254. Robert Kaestner & Darren Lubotsky, Health Insurance and Income Inequality, 30 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 53, 66–67 (2016). 
 255. Id. at 55. 
 256. Id. at 64–65. 
 257. Bruce D. Meyer & James X. Sullivan, Measuring the Well-Being of the Poor Using Income 
and Consumption, 38 J. HUM. RES. 1180, 1180–81 (2003). 
 258. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 334; Crane, supra note 251, at 1174. 
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overstated.259  That leads us to the second—and for this discussion, the criti-
cal—assumption that antitrust enforcement is driving the apparent inequality 
trend. 
Second, consider the empirical evidence supporting a causal link between 
antitrust enforcement and inequality.260  This proffered link remains, thus far, 
largely theoretical and undeveloped empirically.  Populist papers advocating 
for increased antitrust as a salve for increasing inequality do not offer empir-
ical support for their preferred course of treatment.  But other authors have 
begun to explore empirically the proposed tie between antitrust enforcement 
and inequality.  Wright et al., for instance, present time series regressions re-
lating measures of inequality to antitrust enforcement measures.261  While the 
authors acknowledge the standard reasons that these analyses cannot isolate, 
with confidence, causation, their work provides a useful foray into the empir-
ical basis for the notion that antitrust enforcement and inequality are causally 
linked.262  The authors examine data from DOJ investigations between 1984 
and 2016, focusing first on merger investigations, given the populist emphasis 
on merger activity, and then broadly examine all DOJ investigations for a 
more general enforcement measure.263  Their results do not offer “much em-
pirical evidence to substantiate the proposed correlation between antitrust en-
forcement activity and inequality.”264 
Populist claims that increased antitrust enforcement is necessary to com-
bat a severe trend of increasing inequality thus appear to be overstated.  While 
inequality appears to be increasing, the rate is likely more modest than the 
populist movement implies.  And there is, as of yet, no empirical support for 
the underlying proposition that increasing antitrust enforcement levels would 
slow, stop, or reverse this trend. 
 
 259. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 334.  See generally James David, Here’s Why Income Inequality 
is Grossly Exaggerated, FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/ 
2016/01/13/Here-s-Why-Income-Inequality-Grossly-Exaggerated (explaining that the increase of 
“middle-age and old people” in the population, who have worked and accumulated a large amount of 
income, contributes to why the “income inequality appears to be exploding”). 
 260. Baker & Salop, supra note 246, at 1–4 (utilizing statistics to show that “inequality in the United 
States has been growing since the 1980s”). 
 261. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 331–41. 
 262. Id. at 301–02, 337–38. 
 263. Id. at 335–41. 
 264. Id. at 337. 
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V. THE DANGERS OF THE POPULIST ANTITRUST MOVEMENT 
A. Excess Error: The Precautionary Principle Approach 
At root, and in large measure because of the clear lack of evidence sup-
porting its claims, the populist antitrust movement is fundamentally a “pre-
cautionary” approach.  Largely unconcerned with problems that might arise 
from over-enforcement, the populist approach considers the merest possibility 
of harm to be a sufficient basis to proscribe uncertain conduct.  But in an era 
of rapid technological innovation and evolving business models impelled by 
shifting consumer preferences and technological capabilities, such an ap-
proach is extremely costly. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the limita-
tions courts face in distinguishing between pro- and anti-competitive conduct 
in antitrust cases, particularly the risk of false positives in monopolization 
cases.265 
The Court has also expressed concerns, originally laid out in Judge Frank 
Easterbrook’s seminal article, The Limits of Antitrust, that the cost to consum-
ers arising from type I errors might be greater than those attributable to type 
II errors because “the economic system corrects monopoly more readily than 
it corrects judicial errors.”266 
The populist antitrust “precautionary principle” approach is the antithesis 
of this.  It is rooted in a belief that markets do not—or, more charitably, are 
unlikely—to function well in general, and certainly not sufficiently to self-
correct in the face of monopolization.267 
Of course, no one believes that markets are perfect, or that antitrust en-
forcement can never be appropriate.  The question is the marginal, compara-
tive one: Given the realities of politics, economics, the limits of knowledge, 
and the errors they can lead to, which imperfect response is preferable at the 
margin?  That is: Should we give antitrust enforcers and private plaintiffs 
more room to operate, or should we continue to cabin their operation in care-
ful, economically grounded ways, aimed squarely at optimizing—not mini-
mizing—the amount of antitrust enforcement? 
 
 265. See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009); Credit Suisse 
Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 271–72 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 406 (2004). 
 266. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984). 
 267. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 2. 
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This may be a question about changes at the margin, but it is far from 
marginal.  It goes to the heart of the role of the market in the modern econ-
omy.268  While there are plenty of views on this, the arguments that the market 
has failed us in ways that more antitrust regulations would correct are unsup-
ported.  We should certainly continue to look for conditions where market 
failures of one kind or another justify intervention, but we should not make 
policy on the basis of mere speculation, and we should certainly not do so 
without taking into account the likelihood and costs of regulatory failure, as 
well.  To reliably adopt sound antitrust policy that might improve upon the 
status quo (which has evolved over 100 years of judicial decisions, generally 
along with the field’s copious advances in economic understanding), we need 
far better information about the functioning of markets and the consequences 
of regulatory changes than is currently available.  Unfortunately, there is little 
indication that this concern resonates with the proponents of a populist ap-
proach to antitrust. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in the dominant populist antitrust position on 
unilateral conduct (monopolization or abuse of dominance) and vertical re-
straints.  While the consumer welfare approach adheres closely to modern 
economic principles, economics is substantially disregarded by the populist 
approach in favor of unsupported inferences rooted in presumptions of com-
petitive harm based on industry structure (e.g., the extent of concentration in 
a market), particularly in the case of unilateral, vertical restraints.269 
As discussed above, there is no reliable empirical support for claims that 
concentration is increasing, or that it necessarily leads to, or has led to, in-
creased market power and the economic harm associated with it.270  There is 
even less support for claims that concentration leads to the range of social ills 
 
 268. Manne & Hurwitz, supra note 4, at 6. 
 269. Wright et al., supra note 91, at 296–97. 
 270. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden & Luke Froeb, Don't Panic: A Guide to Claims of Increasing 
Concentration, ANTITRUST MAGAZINE 10–11 (Apr. 5, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156912, 
and papers cited therein. 
 No evidence we have uncovered substantiates a broad upward trend in the market con-
centration in the United States, but market concentration undoubtedly has increased signif-
icantly in some sectors, such as wireless telephony.  
 Such increases in concentration, however, do not warrant alarm or imply a failure of 
antitrust.  Increases in market concentration are not a concern of competition policy when 
concentration remains low, yet low levels of concentration are being cited by those alarmed 
about increasing concentration. 
Id.; see also Wright et al., supra note 91, at 323. 
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advocates of populist antitrust ascribe to it.271  By the same token, there is little 
evidence that the application of antitrust or related regulation to more vigor-
ously prohibit, shrink, or break up large companies would correct these as-
serted problems. 
Meanwhile, economic theory, empirical evidence, and experience teach 
that vertical restraints rarely harm competition and often benefit consumers 
by reducing costs, better distributing risk, better informing and optimizing 
R&D activities and innovation, aligning manufacturer and distributor incen-
tives, lowering prices, increasing demand by inducing greater supply of pro-
motional services, and creating more efficient distribution channels. 
As the FTC’s former Director of the Bureau of Economics explained in 
summarizing the body of economic evidence analyzing vertical restraints: 
“[I]t appears that when manufacturers choose to impose [vertical] restraints, 
not only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow con-
sumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provi-
sion.”272  A host of other studies corroborate this assessment.273  As one of 
these notes, “[s]ome studies find evidence consistent with both pro- and anti-
competitive effects . . . virtually no studies can claim to have identified in-
stances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition.”274  
Similarly, “[i]n most of the empirical studies reviewed, vertical practices are 
found to have significant procompetitive effects.”275 
At the very outside, we must consider ourselves to be profoundly uncer-
tain of the effects of vertical conduct (particularly in the context of modern, 
high-tech and platform industries), with the proviso that, so far, most of what 
 
 271. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 11 (explaining that empirical evidence regarding claims that con-
centration leads to a range of social ills, such as less innovation, is debatable and sometimes lacking). 
 272. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empiri-
cal Evidence and Public Policy, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 
2008). 
 273. See, e.g., O’Brien, The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility The-
orems, supra note 243, at 72–76 (“[Vertical restraints] are unlikely to be anticompetitive in most 
cases.”); Cooper, et al., supra note 243, at 18 (concluding that although “some studies find evidence 
consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects . . . virtually no studies can claim to have identi-
fied instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition”); Benjamin Klein, 
Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free-Riding, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 431, 481 
(2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi, Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity 
Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature, 1 J. COMPETITION. L. & ECON. 707, 710 
(2005).  
 274. Cooper et al., supra note 243, at 18. 
 275. Id. at 4. 
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we do know suggests that this conduct is good for consumers.  But even that 
worst-case version of the state of our knowledge is inconsistent with the ap-
proach promoted by populist antitrust.  By adopting presumptions against con-
duct for which there is no economic basis, the populist stance is substantially 
hostile to novel business conduct, especially in these innovative contexts.276  
As a result, antitrust populism necessarily errs on the side of their condemna-
tion, deterring beneficial business activities where authorities should, rather, 
try to better understand them first. 
B. More Politicized Antitrust 
The populist movement’s effort to shift the economic constraints on mod-
ern antitrust jurisprudence to more open-ended enforcement would expose an-
titrust law to increased politicization.277  If enforcers can call upon a large list 
of political justifications for their enforcement decisions, they will be able to 
pursue cases that best fit within a political agenda—which will necessarily 
change over time as political administrations change—rather than being 
forced consistently to focus upon the limited practices that are most injurious 
to consumers.  In proposing such a political regime, the populist antitrust 
model thus largely fails to offer a definable set of metrics to distinguish strong 
cases from weak ones.  What would stand in its place is political discretion. 
But our lived experience is that political discretion is a poor substitute for 
economically-grounded antitrust enforcement.278  As discussed above, United 
States antitrust struggled to incorporate a wide variety of often conflicting 
values throughout the early and mid-twentieth century—and it was anything 
but successful.279 
Despite our nation’s negative experiences with politicized antitrust, many 
modern populist antitrust calls sound remarkably similar to earlier ones.280  
One particularly persistent effort relates to condemning market concentration 
and firm size independently of any evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, 
which is primarily rooted in a reflexive application of the largely-
 
 276. See Gilbert, supra note 173, at 206. 
 277. See Asher Schechter, Is There A Case to be Made for Political Antitrust?, PRO MARKET (Apr. 
28, 2017), https://promarket.org/case-made-political-antitrust/. 
 278. See supra Part II.A. 
 279. See supra Part II.A. 
 280. See Client Memo, supra note 4, at 1–2.  
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discredited281 structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm.282 
Such calls are in vogue today, but it is far from the first time.283  In 1973, 
for instance, “Michigan Senator Philip Hart introduced Senate Bill 1167, the 
Industrial Reorganization Act [(IRA)],284 in order to address perceived prob-
lems arising from industrial concentration.”285  Among other things,286 the bill 
would have required the creation of an “Industrial Reorganization Commis-
sion” to “study the structure, performance, and control” of seven “[p]riority” 
industries,287 and, for each, to “develop a plan of reorganization . . . whether 
or not any corporation [was determined to possess monopoly power].”288  
“The bill was [grounded] in the belief that industry concentration led inexo-
rably to monopoly power; that monopoly power, however obtained, posed an 
inexorable threat to freedom and prosperity; and that the antitrust 
laws . . . were insufficient to address the purported problems.”289  That senti-
ment has “resurfaced today as the asserted justification for similar . . . anti-
trust” reform legislation.290  But as discussed, the populist movement funda-
mentally fails to grapple with the reality that “constraining firm size in an 
effort to promote the political and economic power” of consumers (or of 
 
 281. See Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J. L. & ECON. 
229, 262–63 (1977); Yale Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 826, 
829–31 (1977).  See generally  INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (Harvey J. Gold-
schmid, H. Michael Mann & J. Fred Weston, eds., 1974); Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief 
About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra, at 164–84. 
 282. See JOE BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 372–468 (1968). 
 283. See Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Manne & Manne, supra note 164, at 3. 
 286. See Philip A. Hart, Restructuring the Oligopoly Sector: The Case for a New ‘Industrial Reor-
ganization Act’, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 35, 37 (1972).   Hart asserted that the bill to create a 
federal Industrial Reorganization Commission was offered as “an alternative to government regulation 
and control.”  Id. (reprinting Sen. Hart’s statement, along with the text of the bill and an analysis of 
the bill prepared by the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee staff). 
 287. Id. at 54 (Title I, § 203(a)(1)). 
 288. Id. at 54 ( Title I, § 203(a)(2)). 
 289. Manne & Manne, supra note 164, at 3; Hart, supra note 286, at 50  (“[C]ompetition . . . pre-
serves a democratic society, and provides an opportunity for a more equitable distribution of wealth 
while avoiding the undue concentration of economic, social, and political power; [and] the decline of 
competition in industries with oligopoly or monopoly power has contributed to unemployment, infla-
tion, inefficiency, an underutilization of economic capacity, and the decline of exports . . . .”). 
 290. Manne & Manne, supra  note 164, at 3; see, e.g., Consolidation Prevention and Competition 
Promotion Act, S. 1812, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). 
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favored businesses) “may actually have the opposite of its intended effect.”291 
Another driving force behind the IRA—which we also see echoed to-
day—was the allegation that economic power leads to political power.  This 
is, perhaps, the most consistently leveled attack today: that economic concen-
tration and the presence of large firms lead inexorably to the subversion of 
democracy.292  But this purported causal relationship has already been rejected 
as having no basis in reality; and no new evidence suggests otherwise.293  As 
Henry G. Manne explained in his senate testimony on the IRA in 1974: 
There is, however, a “political” argument that should also be consid-
ered.  It is that some corporations are so large that they are able to 
“control” the Government, presumably as it were, to “buy” the pro-
tection, the subsidy, the transportation system, the war, or whatever 
they want from the Government. . . . 
Unfortunately, the energy utilized in making these assertions is about 
the only force behind them, and again it does not require complicated 
empirical studies to show the error, or perhaps the mendacity . . . be-
hind these assertions. 
There is simply no correlation between the concentration ratio in an 
industry, or the size of its firms, and the effectiveness of the industry 
in the halls of Government. 
This scare argument about the political power of large corporations 
 
 291. Manne & Manne, supra note 164 at 10; see Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 
127 PENN. LAW. REV. 1051, 1058 (1979).   For this reason, even Robert Pitofsky, in his 1979 paper 
advocating in favor of incorporating political concerns into antitrust, noted that not all non-economic 
concerns were appropriate for consideration by antitrust enforcers.  Id.  He found, in particular, at least 
two factors “protection for small businessmen against the rigors of competition” and “income redis-
tribution to achieve social goals,” could “play no useful role in antitrust enforcement”—yet both are 
constituent parts of the populist antitrust resurgence.  Id.; see, e.g., Senate Democrats, “A Better Deal: 
Cracking Down on Corporate Monopolies” (July 2017), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/me-
dia/doc/2017/07/A-Better-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs-1.pdf.  The “Better Deal” claims that 
“[t]he extensive concentration of power in the hands of a few corporations hurts wages, undermines 
job growth, and threatens to squeeze out small businesses, suppliers, and new, innovative competi-
tors.”  Id. at 1.  Its proscriptions are aimed at, among other things, using competition policy to address 
alleged “higher prices, lower pay, the squeezing out of competition, and increasing inequality.”  Id. at 
3. 
 292. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 2–3. 
 293. See Manne & Manne, supra note 164, at 19–20. 
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is a sham. 
We all know that the institutions that influence policies in Washing-
ton are those that can deliver the votes or utilize their finances to se-
cure votes. 
And these are the very practices that large corporations are relatively 
weakest in performing, especially as compared to unions, farmers, 
consumer organizations, environmentalists, and other large voting 
blocks.   
There is even less substance to this political argument about corpo-
rate concentration than there is to the economic ones.294 
Many things other than dollars influence political decision-making.  It can 
hardly be said that any large company succeeds in all its efforts to influence 
politics—just as it must be acknowledged that relatively small companies, la-
bor unions, activist organizations, and even well-connected individuals often 
succeed in theirs.295  Not only is the risk of political influence arising from 
concentrated industry overstated, the risks and costs of adopting politicized 
enforcement are, as discussed, significantly understated. 
Indeed, we have observed the costs of politicized antitrust, and our expe-
rience is that they are both real and significant.  When “imbue[d] . . . with an 
ill-defined set of vague [socio-]political objectives,” antitrust becomes a sort 
of “meta-legislation.”296  “As a result, the return on influencing a handful of 
government appoint[ees] with authority over antitrust becomes 
huge . . . [thereby] increasing [significantly] . . . the incentive[s] to do so.”297 
 
 294. Id. (emphasis added). 
 295. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What 
Else Counts?, 125 U. PENN. L. REV. 1191, 1198 n.26 (1977).   No doubt, at the margin, “small or me-
dium size companies can rarely match the resources of a corporate leviathan in seeking government 
bestowed advantages.”  Id.  But there are a lot of “corporate leviathans.”  Id.  Moreover, it must be 
“said that some small companies also have been adroit in securing favors from the state.  The exemp-
tion which hog cholera serum producers have received from the antitrust laws is only one example.  7 
U.S.C. § 852 (1970).”  Id.  There are, of course, countless other examples. 
 296. Geoffrey Manne, The Antitrust Laws Are Not Some Meta-Legislation Authorizing Whatever 
Regulation Activists Want: Labor Market Edition, TRUTH ON MARKET (Sep. 22, 2017), https://truthon-
themarket.com/2017/09/22/the-antitrust-laws-are-not-some-meta-legislation-authorizingwhatever-
regulation-activists-want-labor-market-edition/.  
 297. Id. 
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As Baumol and Ordover observe, antitrust law is inherently prone to rent-
seeking, especially protectionism.298  This rent-seeking, in turn, leads to nu-
merous harms, including the misallocation of resources (both government and 
private), less efficient firms, and a diversion of firms’ energies towards less 
productive ends, including both offensive (aimed at having enforcers investi-
gate and prosecute competitors) and defensive (protecting oneself from such 
endeavors and actions) efforts.299  It can also lead to regulatory capture, 
whereby enforcers may be “captured” by certain interests and fail to act in a 
way that aligns with their stated objectives.300  Explicitly incorporating opaque 
socio-political goals into antitrust enforcement only exacerbates these harmful 
tendencies—and simultaneously decreases the ability to hold captured enforc-
ers responsible, as they can justify nearly any outcome.301  Indeed, evidence 
drawn from analyzing early enforcement actions, arising before antitrust fully 
embraced the consumer welfare standard—and when it was seeking to further 
a wider set of socio-political goals—indicates that such public interest factors 
failed to explain significant percentages of enforcement actions.302 
The economically grounded consumer welfare standard helped substan-
tially to cabin such harms and align enforcement with consumer interests.303  
But reintroducing a political dimension to antitrust law would reestablish a 
regime inherently prone to capture by rivals seeking to ride populist waves of 
protectionism to economic dominance.  And so politicized antitrust is, quite 
contrary to the populist movement’s stated goals, a recipe for a corporate wel-
fare regime. 
Moreover, as discussed, when antitrust policy is unmoored from eco-
nomic analysis, it exhibits fundamental and highly problematic contradic-
tions.304  Perhaps most critically, attempting to promote socio-political goals 
 
 298. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J. L. 
& ECON 247, 250–52 (1985). 
 299. Id. at 250–51. 
 300. See Elyse Dorsey, Jan M. Rybnicek & Joshua D. Wright, Hipster Antitrust Meets Public 
Choice Economics: The Consumer Welfare Standard, Rule of Law, and Rent Seeking, COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT’L 3–5 (April 2018). 
 301. See, e.g., id. at 5–6. 
 302. See id. 
 303. See supra Part III. 
 304. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 96 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 583, 585 (2018) (“As a movement, antitrust often succeeds at capturing political attention and 
engaging at least some voters, but it fails at making effective or even coherent policy.  The result is 
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through competition laws tends to undermine competition itself.305  If compe-
tition law is unconstrained on its own terms—that is, if it is unmoored from a 
set of subject-specific limitations imposed by courts and legislatures—it 
threatens to morph into a large, sprawling, economy-wide set of regulations 
resembling a national industrial policy.306  The merits or demerits of actually 
having an economy-wide industrial policy aside, it is unquestionably a per-
version of competition law to facilitate the imposition of policies from law 
and regulation outside of competition policy in ways that, of necessity, will 
promote other polices at the very expense of competition. 
“[F]inally, if the underlying basis for antitrust enforcement is extended 
beyond economic welfare effects, how long can we expect to resist calls to 
restrain enforcement precisely to further those goals?”307  The effort and in-
centive to obtain exemptions would be significantly increased “as the persua-
siveness of the claimed justifications for those exemptions [(]which already 
encompass non-economic goals308[) would] be greatly enhanced.”309  The end 
result could “even be more concentration . . . [as the] exceptions could sub-
sume the rules.”310 
This discussion highlights the “fundamental, underlying problem: 
If . . . antitrust [becomes] more political,” the outcome will be “less demo-
cratic, more politically determined, results—precisely the opposite of what 
proponents claim to want.”311 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The populist antitrust movement of the last few years has struck a power-
ful chord that continues to resonate today.  It purportedly identifies an array 
of dire problems and offers a simple and long-overlooked solution to them all: 
 
goals that are unmeasurable and fundamentally inconsistent, although with their contradictions rarely 
exposed.”). 
 305. See supra Part V. 
 306. See supra Section III.B. 
 307. Geoffrey Manne, The illiberal vision of neo-Brandesian antitrust, TRUTH ON MARKET (Apr. 
16, 2018), https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/04/16/the-illiberal-vision-of-neo-brandeisian-antitrust/. 
 308. See generally ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
Chap. IV.B 333–342 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_ 
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antitrust law.  But analysis of these claims and purported solutions demon-
strates systemic, fatal shortcomings.  The trends which populist supporters 
allegedly identify are not supported by strong (or any) evidence.  The connec-
tion between antitrust enforcement and the alleged problems is similarly 
weak, at best. 
And these calls to dramatically upend antitrust law ignore our nation’s 
experience of attempting to enforce antitrust laws in a regime remarkably sim-
ilar to what populists today desire.  This regime was internally inconsistent 
and allowed regulators to enforce (or not) based upon their subjective weigh-
ing of numerous, vague goals—and resulted in higher prices, less innovation, 
and lower quality.  This regime not only undermined the rule of law, but also 
fostered a regime where enforcers were exceptionally prone to rent-seeking 
and capture. 
We have learned a tremendous amount about how to effectively enforce 
antitrust law over the last several decades.  This includes acknowledging its 
limitations and focusing upon its strengths.  Competition laws are powerful 
tools when properly targeted.  But when improperly targeted, they tend not 
only to undermine competition itself, but also to fail to achieve other offsetting 
goals.  Resisting populist calls to ignore this experience and to embrace polit-
icized antitrust is critical to the continued viability of our competition efforts. 
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